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Abstract
We study the collusive efficacy of competition clauses (CC) such as the meeting competition clause
(MCC) and the beating competition clauses (BCC) in a general framework. In contrast to previous
theoretical studies, we allow for repeated interaction among the retailers and heterogeneity in their
sales capacities. Besides that, the selection of the form of the CC is endogeneized. The retailers
choose among a wide range of CC types - including the conventional ones such as the MCC and
the BCCs with lump sum refunds. Several common statements about the collusive (in)efficacy of
CCs cannot be upheld in our framework. We show that in the absence of hassle costs, MCCs might
induce collusion in homogeneous markets even if they are adopted only by few retailers. If hassle and
implementation costs are mild, collusion can be enforced by BCCs with lump sum refunds. Remark-
ably, these findings hold for any reasonable rationing rule. However, a complete specification of all
collusive CCs is in general impossible without any further reference to the underlying rationing rule.
JEL–Classifications: L11, L13, L41
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1 Introduction
Low price guarantees in which the retailers promise to match or beat any lower price announced by a
competitor are widely used in retail markets. Such guarantees have been popular in various market
segments such as consumer electronics, automotive parts, DIY products, and glasses, to name only a
few. Presumably, most readers of this paper could quote a retailer offering a low price guarantee.
Competition economists have already dealt with low price guarantees since the early 80s, starting
with the seminal papers of Hay (1982) and Salop (1986). Since then, various explanations for these
marketing practices have been provided and the question of whether such practices are a matter of
competitive concern have run through many of those studies. Our paper aims to contribute to this
still ongoing debate. In doing so, we adopt the terminology often applied in research and refer to low
price guarantees as competition clauses (CC) from now on.
Most of the papers on this subject (in particular, the earlier papers like the ones of Hay, 1982, and
Salop, 1986) are very skeptical regarding CCs. Despite of their pro-competitive appeal, such clauses
are viewed as a cunning device facilitating tacit collusion. A situation in which the retailers charge
an excessively high price for the commodity might be unsustainable in competitive markets as each
retailer is tempted to slightly undercut the price in order to attract customers of its competitors.
However, this incentive can be suspended if the competitors have adopted CCs; for example in form
of price matching, also known as the meeting competition clause (MCC). A retailer could not profit
by underselling its competitors in this case as their MCCs ensure that a lower price is immediately
matched by them.
Although these arguments seem quite convincing, the claim that CCs are anti-competitive prac-
tices has come under severe attack for several reasons. One reason is that most of the studies backing
the claim, e.g., Doyle (1988), Logan and Lutter (1989) and Zhang (1995), imply that any retailer
has to adopt these clauses. This implication is however far away from the reality; usually, if CCs are
offered in some market, then only by a few retailers.
A further strong objection has been put forward by Hviid and Shaffer (1994) and Corts (1995).
They argue that even though all retailers have adopted CCs, collusion can still be levered out if one of
the retailers turns its CC into the following pledge to its customers: “Whenever my announced price
exceeds the lowest price in the market, your are entitled to buy the commodity at a price beating the
lowest price by an amount equal to a fixed proportion of the difference between my announced price
and the lowest price.”
Such beating competition clause (BCC) enables the retailer to undersell the competitors by “over-
cutting”, i.e., by announcing a price above the collusive price. Since (conventional) CCs refer to the
announced prices, the price paid at its competitors is not affected by such price announcement and,
thus, still corresponds to the collusive price. However, by exercising the BCC of the retailer, its cus-
tomers pay a lower price. In consequence, the retailer is able to undercut the collusive price without
unleashing the CCs of its competitors.
Apart from that, Hviid and Shaffer (1999) have pointed to another factor which could undermine
the collusive efficacy of CCs, the hassle costs of the customers. Such costs encompass the time and
effort a customer has to spend in order to enforce the CCs (e.g., by providing the required proofs
and by finding a qualified salesperson). The consequences of these costs are that CCs like the MCC
become a blunt instrument to deter competitors from defection. To understand this argument, let us
consider a competitor undercutting the collusive price. The retailers with MCCs immediately match
this lower price. However, the effective price (i.e., the price including the hassle) the customers of
those retailers would have to pay still exceeds the announced price of the competitor; with the final
consequence that these customers finally switch to the defecting competitor.
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Also partly in view of these criticisms, competition economists have sought out motivations others
than tacit collusion for the use of low price guarantees. Starting with the paper of Png and Hirshleifer
(1987), some of them regard CCs as a tool to price differentiate between various groups of consumers,
e.g., between the group of uninformed loyals and well informed shoppers. Others like Moorthy and
Winter (2006) view such clauses as a device signaling low prices for the customers which are not
informed about the actual prices charged by the retailers.
None of these alternative explanations are denied in this paper. However, we question the criticism
of the claim that CCs are a device facilitating tacit collusion. Our conjecture is that the points of
criticism we invoked above are due to specific market settings assumed in the models. The primary
aim of our paper is to investigate this conjecture. In doing so, we will examine the collusive efficacy
of CCs in a market setting in several aspects more general than those used in the earlier studies.
Unlike most of those studies, we do not restrict our analysis to the duopoly case. Rather, we
consider some homogeneous oligopolistic retail market, i.e., the retailers offer the same commodity
and are not spatially differentiated. Moreover, we follow the setup of Corts (1995) and allow retailers
to choose any conceivable form of CC - including the CCs most common in real business life.
A further distinctive characteristic of our approach is that we take into account that the retailers
compete repeatedly. Since the end point of the competition might be unknown to them, the market
is modeled as an infinite multi-stage game. As far as we know, the only two other papers which study
the collusive efficacy of CCs within such game-theoretical framework are those of Liu (2013) and
Cabral et al. (2021). However, their market settings are significantly more specific than ours. Both
articles assume a duopoly and substantially restrict the CC options available for the two retailers.
Moreover, they analyze only specific spreading patterns of those CCs so that their results turn out
to be incomplete with respect to our concern.
Another peculiarity of our model is that the retailers might have different sales capacities. Most
of the previous studies on CCs have (implicitly) taken for granted that the sales capacities of the
retailers are unbounded and the demand is equally split among the retailers whenever they announce
the same price. Unlike those studies, the retailers can have different market shares in our framework
as a result of their heterogeneous sales capacities.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other paper which has so far examined the collusive efficacy
of CCs in markets with capacity-constrained retailers is the one of Tumennasan (2013). It rests on the
two-stage duopoly framework proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman (1983); the retailers choose their
sales capacities in the first stage and fix the commodity prices in the second stage. The novel feature
in the model of Tumennasan (2013) is that in the second stage, each duopolist has the additional
option to implement the MCC. The results of the paper are mixed. It turned out that the MCC
might not necessarily increase the market price in this framework. Indeed, if the capacity costs are
sufficiently large, then the MCC have either no effect or even lead to a decrease in the market price.
The approach we pursue deviates substantially from the one of Tumennasan (2013). First, the
forms of the CC rather than the sales capacities are endogeneized in our paper; the sales capacities of
the retailers are assumed to be invariable for an indefinite period of time and are taken as constant.
Besides that, most parts of our analysis do not rely on a specific rationing rule. Instead of assuming
efficient rationing as Tumennasan (2013) did, we only require that the rationing rule have some (less
contentious) properties which are satisfied by any prominent rationing rule such as the efficient or
the proportional rule.1
1In their seminal paper, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) have demonstrated that the subgame perfect equilibrium of their
two-stage competition game induces exactly the quantities one would obtain from the standard Cournot competition game.
This result provides an instructive foundation of Cournot competition. However, as forcefully put forward by Davidson and
Deneckere (1986), it proves to be quite fragile. If a rationing rule different from efficient rationing is applied to the game,
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This generality enables us to go beyond the fundamental question whether CCs could be used to
enforce collusion. If this fundamental claim can be affirmed, our framework allows us to examine the
spread and form of the collusive CCs. Regarding the spread, we are in particular interested in the
issue whether collusion requires that all retailers adopt CCs or whether it suffices that some of them
do it. Regarding the form, it might be interesting to know whether the MCCs induce collusion and,
if not, which other forms of CCs could do it.
To address these issues, we have organized the paper as follows. In Section 2, we present the
market model on which our analysis of competition clause policies is based. The model is an extended
capacity-constrained Bertrand competition game; before competing in prices infinitely often, the
retailers have to select a binding competition clause policy. This game is solved by the concept of
subgame perfectness in Section 3. It turns out that if the hassle and implementation costs are
sufficiently small and the retailers are neither too short-sighted nor too far-sighted, then partial
adoption of CCs suffices to induce collusion.
In Section 4, we discuss the existence, robustness, and explicit presentation of the collusive
competition clause policies. It is shown that collusion can always be reached by the retailers regardless
of which time preferences they have and which rationing rule applies to the residual market demand.
However, it is not always possible to specify all collusive competition clause policies without any
further assumptions about the underlying rationing rule. We conclude the paper in Section 5
with some remarks regarding our approach and possible future research projects. The proofs of our
theorems are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Bertrand Markets with Competition Clauses
The markets we study in this paper are oligopolistic commodity markets. Their supply side consists of
a set I := {1, . . . , n} of retailers where n ≥ 2. All retailers offer the same commodity and the provision
of the commodity generates constant and identical marginal costs c ≥ 0 for any of them. Moreover,
each retailer faces a (positive and real-valued) capacity constraint, the upper limit of the commodities
the retailer is able to supply. Without loss of generality, we assume that the retailers’ sales capacities
differ from each other so that we can arrange them in an increasing order k1 < k2 < · · · < kn.2 The
capacity of the non-empty set J ⊆ I of retailers is summarized by KJ :=
∑
j∈J kj . We define K∅ := 0
and denote the total (market-wide) capacity by K := KI . Retailer i’s share of the total capacity is
denoted by κi :=
ki
K




The competition between the retailers is modeled as a multi-stage game with infinite horizon. In
the first stage (period t = −1), the retailers simultaneously announce their competition clause poli-
cies. Afterwards, the retailers participate in an infinitely repeated Bertrand competition, i.e., they
simultaneously announce prices for the commodity in any of the succeeding and infinitely countable
stages (periods t = 0, 1, . . . ). We call the first stage the clause implementation phase and the suc-
ceeding stages the price competition phase. The timing of our competition game is depicted by the
below figure in which the arrow represents the time axis.
e.g., the proportional one, then it cannot any more be upheld. To avoid such fragility of our results, we have abstained
from assuming a specific rationing rule. Rather, we have striven to impose only some fundamental and less demanding
requirements on the rationing rules.
2We remark that our analysis could be extended to include cases in which retailers have identical sales capacities.
However, such generalization would expand the set of solutions without any added value. It then would hold: If outcome
o satisfies property P , then outcome õ which differs from o only by permuting the retailers so that the capacities are still
ordered in a non-decreasing way would also satisfy this property. To circumvent such multiplicity, we have refrained from
such generalization.
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Implementation Phase Price Competition Phase
Our game-theoretical setup resembles that adopted in the literature on (partial) cartel formation,
e.g. in Selten (1973), D’Aspremont et al. (1983), Escrihuela-Villar (2008), and Bos and Harrington
(2010). Those studies endogenize the formation of cartels by multi-stage games where a cartel par-
ticipation stage in which the firms decide about whether to enter the cartel precedes the competition
stage. The competition between the firms is treated differently in those studies; either as a finite
game like in the two former articles or as an infinitely repeated game like in the later two articles.
Besides the time horizon, our setup also has in common with Bos and Harrington (2010) that the
firms are heterogeneous with regard to their sales capacities.
An overview of the game-theoretical studies on competition clause policies reveals that different
timing structures regarding the retailers’ decisions have been studied. Some authors like Doyle (1988),
Corts (1995), and Kaplan (2000) take for granted that each retailer decides simultaneously about the
adoption of CCs and the advertised prices. A sequential timing structure in which the competition
clauses take the form of binding commitments and are announced before the prices are fixed has been
adopted e.g. in Logan and Lutter (1989), Zhang (1995), Chen (1995), and Liu (2013). However,
different time horizons of the price competition phase are assumed in these articles. The former three
regard price competition as a one-stage game, whereas the latter models it as an infinitely repeated
game like we do.
In the following three subsections, we will detail the peculiarities of our market model. This
exposition follows the chronological order of the game. First, we specify the options available for the
retailers in the clause implementation phase. After that, we turn to the price competition phase and
describe the market environment the retailers face. A comprehensive game-theoretical description of
our model is given in the last subsection.
To abridge the succeeding presentation, we introduce additional notation. Let A be some set.
The indicator mapping of set A is denoted by 1A : X → R, i.e., 1A(x) = 1 if x ∈ A and 1A(x) = 0
otherwise. The cardinality of A is expressed by |A|. By definition, |I| = n. As is standard, we denote
the sets of integers and real numbers by Z and R, respectively. The set of the non-negative integers
and non-negative real numbers are represented by Z+ and R+, respectively. If the number zero is
excluded from R+, we write R++. The set of the non-negative real n-tuples is denoted by R
I
+.
Subsets of I are called coalitions of retailers. For any k ∈ I, we define Ik := {k, . . . , n}, i.e., Ik is
the coalition of the n+ 1− k largest retailers. Obviously, I1 = I. Let J be some coalition of retailers.
We denote the complement of J by −J := I \ J . An n-tuple x := (xi)i∈I is referred to as a profile
of realizations. We sometimes express profile x by (xJ , x−J) and, if J = {i}, simply by (xi, x−i). If
all values of profile x are real numbers, then x is termed numerical. The lowest value of a numerical
profile x is denoted by xmin := min{xi : i ∈ I} and its greatest value by xmax := max{xi : i ∈ I}.
Suppose some numerical profile x := (xi)i∈I and some α ∈ R. We denote the set of all retailers
which have realized a value equal to α by [x = α]. In general, if R is binary relation on R, we define
[xRα] := {i ∈ I : xiRα}. Let σ be a permutation on I so that composition y := x ◦ σ gives the
values of x in a non-decreasing order, i.e., i < j whenever xσ(i) < xσ(j). We remark that yi represents
the i-th smallest value among the values listed in x. It is called the i-th order statistic of x and is
henceforth denoted by x(i). Obviously, x(1) = xmin and x(n) = xmax.
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2.1 Clause Implementation Phase
The first stage of our competition game is the clause implementation stage. In this phase, each
retailer chooses a competition clause policy gi. Such a policy is described as a mapping gi : R
I
+ → R+
which specifies the sales price gi(q) guaranteed by retailer i for any announcement q := (qi)i∈I of
prices. In accordance with the terminology widely used in the Industrial Organization literature, we
call gi(q) the guaranteed price of retailer i and profile q the retailers’ advertised prices.
From now on, we also take for granted that any competition clause policy gi satisfies condition
(G) gi(q) ∈
{
[c, qi] if qi > max{qmin, c},
{qi} otherwise.
and denote the set of the competition clauses policies of retailer i satisyfing Assumption (G) by Gi.
In the implementation stage, each retailer i ∈ I is faced with the decision problem to select one of
the policies from set Gi.
According to the above definition, the competition clauses policies are tied to the advertised
prices, but not to the guaranteed ones. In this regard, we follow the approach of Corts (1995) rather
than that of Kaplan (2000). However, the set of available competition clause policies in our setting
substantially differs from the one assumed in Corts (1995). While Corts (1995) requires that the
price guaranteed by a retailer be based only on two advertised prices, the price advertised by the
retailer and the lowest advertised price in the market, we allow that the guaranteed price depends
on any advertised price. Our generalization therefore includes CCs directed against some specific
competitors.3
Moreover, we point out that Assumption (G) imposes several restrictions on the competition
clause policies. First, it requires that the guaranteed price correspond to the advertised price whenever
the advertised price is the lowest advertised price in the market. This restriction precludes so-called
“beat-any-deal” CCs. Such clauses promise the customers to undercut any (and not only any lower)
price advertised by some competitor at least by some specified amount or percentage.
Apart from that, Assumption (G) ensures that if the advertised price does not fall short of the
marginal costs, then the guaranteed price does not so either. This requirement can be interpreted as
an exit option for the retailer. It precludes that a CC-adopting retailer might be forced to sell the
commodity at a price below its marginal cost. A justification of this restriction might be that such
loss-making situations are not sustainable so that sooner or later such CCs will be abandoned.4
The latter restriction is in line with several theoretical studies on CCs which also take for granted
that there is a lower bound on the guaranteed prices; for example, Kaplan (2000) assumes that the
guaranteed prices are non-negative like any other price. In contrast, Corts (1995) does not impose
such restriction. Nevertheless, as can be easily checked, any of the results derived in Corts (1995)
are also valid if our setting is adopted. We remark that we could generalize our analysis by assuming
3A real life example of such a selective CC is the Amazon and Walmart price match promise of the US online clothing and
homeware retailer Zulily. On its website (see https://www.zulily.com/best-price-promise/41483705?fromEvent=5564,
retrieved at January 13, 2021), Zulily pledges its customers: “If you spot one of our finds at a lower price at Amazon.com
or Walmart.com before we do, we’ll gladly match their price for the same size and color!”
4An illustrative example about how the implementation of a unrestricted CC inflicted losses on the retailer is the incident
reported by Robin Young in the article “Tesco Toes the Line in Sock Price War” in The Times on February 3, 1998. UK
retailer Tesco was selling a certain brand of sport socks at a package price of £8 and guaranteed to refund its customers by
the double of the price difference if they find a competitor offering the product at a lower price. Essential Sports, a small
sporting good store, responded to Tesco’s price-beating guarantee by selling the same brand of sports socks at a package
price of 10p. By invoking the offer of Essential Sports, customers of Tesco received a net payment of £7.80 for acquiring a
package of sport socks. Arbatskaya et al. (2004) already pointed to this absurd case in their empirical study on the incidence
and variety of competition clauses.
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less restrictive lower bounds on the guaranteed prices. However, we decided to refrain from such
generalizations as it would make our analysis more tedious without gaining additional insights.
The simplest competition clause policy is the one stipulating that the guaranteed price always
corresponds to the advertised price. This policy is defined by wi(q) := qi for any profile q of advertised
prices and is called the trivial competition clause policy or, simply, the no clause option. Due to
Assumption (G), any other competition clause policy gi has the property c ≤ gi(q) < qi for some
profile q of advertised prices satisfying qi > max{qmin, c}. Henceforth, we denote the set containing
all non-trivial competition clause policies (i.e., the CCs) available for retailer i by Ci.
A CC with lump sum refund entitles the customers to purchase the commodity at a price equal
to competitors’ lowest advertised price minus a specific fixed amount if the retailer fails to advertise
the lowest price in the market. In detail: Let µ ∈ R. A competition clause ge,µi of retailer i is said
to be a CC with lump sum refund µ if
ge,µi (q) := min{max{qmin − 1[q>qmin](i)µ, c}, qi}
for any profile q of advertised prices.
Obviously, the CC of the form mi := g
e,0
i entitles the customer to purchase the commodity at the
lowest advertised price in the market. This clause is referred to as the meeting competition clause,
also known as the price-matching guarantee. It is the most prominent type of a CC, and most of the
scientific literature on CCs focuses on this type. A CC of the form be,µi := g
e,µ
i with µ > 0 is referred
to as a beating competition clause with a lump sum refund. It entitles the customers to purchase the
commodity at a price falling short of the lowest advertised price in the market by the amount µ if
the retailer fails to advertise the lowest price in the market.5
A clause profile g := (gi)i∈I summarizes the competition clause policies chosen in the retail market.
For example, profile w := (wi)i∈I describes the situation in which none of the retailers offers a CC
and profile m := (mi)i∈I describes the situation in which all retailers offer the MCC. The set of the
clause profiles in which the retailers’ competition clause policies satisfy Assumption (G) is denoted
by G := ×i∈IGi. Let us pick some arbitrary clause profile g ∈ G. We define C(g) := {i ∈ I : gi ∈ Ci}
as the set of retailers which have adopted a CC in clause profile g. If there is a µi ∈ R for any
i ∈ C(g) so that gi = ge,µii , i.e., if each CC-adopting retailer chooses a CC with a lump sum refund,
then g is referred to as a conventional clause profile.
Our competition model adopts some of the peculiarities of the models of Chen (1995) as well as of
Hviid and Shaffer (1999). Like Chen (1995), we assume that implementing CCs causes one-off costs
for the retailers. All retailers implementing CCs incur the same fixed costs in the amount of f > 0
regardless of the chosen type of CC. The implementation costs encompass the costs of creating the
technical and personnel prerequisites for implementing a CC as well as of making the CC publicly
known. Since such expenses are largely one-off and more or less the same for any of the CC-adopting
retailers, our assumption of fixed and identical implementation costs might be reasonable. Only
retailers offering no CCs bear no fixed costs. For the sake of simplification, we take for granted that
f is discounted to period 0.
Like Hviid and Shaffer (1999), we assume that exercising CCs might be costly for the customers.
All customers making use of a CC incur the same hassle costs in the amount of z ≥ 0 per purchased
unit of the commodity regardless of at which retailer the commodity has been purchased and which
type of CC has been offered. The existence of hassle costs might be justified by the real life experience
5For example, such BCC is offered by the New Zealand tyre retailer Tony’s Tyre Service. They announce on their
website (see https://www.tonystyreservice.co.nz/tyres/price-beat-guarantee, retrieved on January 13, 2021): “We
stock leading tyre brands, at discount prices. Find a lower cash price and we guarantee to beat it by [NZ]$ 10 a tyre on a
similar quality product.”
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that exercising CCs is usually not a smooth process. In general, the burden of proof rests on the
customers. They have to spend time and effort to receive the refund guaranteed by the CC, e.g., for
providing enough and sound evidence, seeking out qualified salespersons and raising the issue with
them. If one takes for granted that each customer buys one unit of the commodity, our assumption
that the hassle costs are measured per unit of the commodity seems plausible. The assumption that
the hassle costs are identical among the customers has been made for reasons of simplification.
The effective purchase price gives the costs the customer incurs for acquiring a unit of the com-
modity. This price includes the hassle costs whenever the customer has exercised the retailer’s CC.
The effective sales price is the revenue the retailer earns per sold unit of the commodity. To provide
a formal specification of these prices, consider the situation in which retailer i has opted for the com-
petition clause policy gi and the retailers in the market advertise prices q = (qj)j∈I . The effective
purchase price of the commodity at retailer i is determined by formula
qpi := g
p
i (q) := qi + 1Ci(gi) min{gi(q) + z − qi, 0}
and the effective sales price by formula
qsi := g
s
i(q) := qi − 1R++(qi − g
p
i (q)) (qi − gi(q)).
Obviously, if gi = wi (i.e., retailer i does not adopt a CC) or gi(q) + z ≥ qi (i.e., it is not
worthwhile for the customers to make use of retailer i’s CC), then both the effective purchase and the
effective sales price at retailer i are equal to the advertised price. Otherwise, the effective sales price
corresponds to the price guaranteed by the retailers and the effective purchase price is the effective
sales price plus the hassle costs.
2.2 Price Competition Phase
Having adopted their competition clause profiles g := (gi)i∈I , the retailers take part in an infinitely
repeated Bertrand competition. At each stage t ∈ Z+ of this phase, the retailers simultaneously
advertise a price for the commodity. We denote the price advertised by retailer i at stage t by qti and
the profile listing all prices advertised at stage t by qt := (qti)i∈I . The effective sales and purchase
prices at stage t are then given by qs,t := gs(qt) and qp,t := gp(qt), respectively.
The demand side at stage t is described by market demand mapping D : R+ → R+. Its value
D(p) indicates the total quantity of the commodity demanded by the consumers if they have to pay
price p per unit of the commodity. The market demand mapping is time invariant and, therefore, not
marked with a stage index t. Moreover, we assume that
(D1) D is continuous,
(D2) there is some p̄ > c so that D−1(0) = [p̄,+∞[ and D is decreasing on [0, p̄[.
These postulates are standard. Price p̄ gives the highest amount the consumers are willing to pay
for the commodity and is known as the reservation price of the demand side. Due to Assumptions
(D1) and (D2), the monopolistic profit mapping π : R+ → R given by π(p) := (p−c)D(p) is continuous
and positive on open interval ]c, p̄[. Regarding the form of the profit mapping, it is taken for granted
that
(D3) π is strictly quasiconcave on ]c, p̄[.
It follows from Assumptions (D1), (D2), and (D3) that there exists a unique pm which maximizes
π. We term price pm as the collusive price and denote the monopolistic profit attained this price by
7
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πm := π(pm). One can show that Assumption (D3) results if demand mapping D satisfies (D2) and
is concave on ]c, p̄[.6A further requirement we impose on our competition model is that
(D4) D(c) ≤ K−i for any i ∈ I.
Assumption (D4) states that the capacities of any coalition of n-1 retailers are sufficient to meet
the market demand at price equal marginal costs. If the capacity-constrained retailers were to take
part in a static Bertrand competition without CCs, then this assumption would entail that (i) the
situation in which each retailer charges a price equal to the marginal costs is a Nash equilibrium and
(ii) each retailer earns a zero profit in any Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that the consumers face purchase prices p := (pi)i∈I at stage t. Moreover, consider some
additional and hypothetical purchase price r. The residual market demand at r is defined as the
market demand at r not met by the capacities of the retailers undercutting price r. A rationing rule
would determine the exact size of residual market demand R(r|p). In the following, we present three
rationing rules, the efficient, the proportional and the perfect one. The former two have already been
extensively applied in the scientific literature.
 The efficient rationing rule Re(·|·) has been proposed by Levitan and Shubik (1972) as well as
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983). It lays down that consumers with the highest willingness to pay
are served first. In formal terms, the residual market demand resulting from efficient rationing
is given by
Re(r|p) := max{D(r)−K[p<r], 0}
for any profile p ∈ RI+ of purchase prices and any hypothetical purchase price r ∈ R+.
 The proportional rationing rule Rp(·|·) has been advocated by Beckmann (1965) as well as
Davidson and Deneckere (1986). It stipulates that each of the consumers have the same prob-
ability of being served. The residual market demand resulting from proportional rationing is
inductively specified by
Rp(r|p) :=




D(r) for any p(i) < r ≤ p(i+1)
where p(i) is the i-th order statistic of price profile p (i.e., the i-th smallest price in p) and
p(n+1) := +∞.
 The perfect rationing rule is the opposite extreme of the efficient rationing rule. This rule
stipulates that consumers with the lowest willingness to pay are served first. The residual
market demand resulting from perfect rationing is inductively specified by
Rl(r|p) :=
 D(r) for any r ≤ p(1),min{D(r),max{Rl(p(i)|p)−K[p=p(i)], 0}} for any p(i) < r ≤ p(i+1)
where p(i) is the i-th order statistic of price profile p and p(n+1) := +∞.
6To see this, we take into account that Assumption (D2) implies (D(p)−D(p′)) (p − p′) < 0 for any different prices
p, p′ ∈]c, p̄[. Consider some arbitrary, but different prices p, p′ ∈]c, p̄[. Without any loss of generality, we can suppose that
π(p′) ≤ π(p). It holds:
π(p′) ≤ λπ(p) + (1− λ)π(p′)
=
(
λD(p) + (1− λ)D(p′)
) (

















for any λ ∈]0, 1[.
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In most parts of this paper, we abstain from assuming a specific rationing rule . Rather, we only
postulate that residual market demand mapping R : R+ ×RI+ → R+ satisfy the property
(R1) Re(r|p) ≤ R(r|p) ≤ Rl(r|p),
(R2) R(r|p̃) = R(r|p) if p̃i = pi for any i ∈ [p < r] and p̃i ≥ r for any i ∈ [p ≥ r].
Assumption (R1) requires that the lower and upper bound of the residual market demand be
the residual market demands resulting from the efficient and perfect rationing rule, respectively.
Assumption (R2) states that the residual market demand at price r is unaffected by price changes
in which the prices below r are kept constant and the other prices do not fall below r. Obviously,
both assumptions are innocuous as any reasonable rationing rule is compatible with it; for example,
the three rationing rules specified above.
The quantity of the commodity demanded by the consumers from retailer i at stage t and purchase
prices p := (pi)i∈I is derived from the residual market demand. We assume that demand mapping
Di : R
I





for any profile p ∈ RI+ of purchase prices.
According to this definition, the proportion of the residual market demand directed to retailer i
corresponds to i’s share of the total capacity of the retailers charging the same price as retailer i. An
argument substantiating such demand allocation is that consumers are more likely to meet retailers
with higher sales capacities than those with lower sales capacities so that they more likely to buy
the commodity from the former retailers than from the later ones. This allocation rule has already
been applied in other studies on Bertrand competition with capacity constraints; e.g., in Allen and
Hellwig (1986) as well as Osborne and Pitchik (1986).7
A retailer i is able to serve demand Di(p) as long as the demand does not exceed its capacity
constraint ki. The mapping Xi : R
I
+ → R+ indicating the quantity
Xi(p) := min{ki, Di(p)}
of the commodity retailer i is able to sell at profile p of purchase prices is referred to as the sales
mapping of retailer i. We conclude from Assumptions (R1) and (I) that if the purchase price of the
commodity is the same at any retailer (i.e., pi = pj for any j ∈ I), then retailer i’s share of the total
sales equals κi. For this reason, it is justified to interpret κi as retailer i’s market share at price p.
Moreover, Assumption (D4) entails that κi corresponds to the proportion of the market demand
retailer i serves if pi = pj for any j ∈ I and pi ≥ c.
Let us now turn to the situation in which the retailers have implemented competition clause
policies g and advertise prices q := (qi)i∈I in period t. The profit retailer i earns in this period is
given by
πgi (q) := (q
s
i − c)Xi(qp).
Recall that qsi := g
s
i(q) is the effective sales price charged by retailer i and q
p := gp(q) summarizes
the effective purchase prices in the market. The mapping πgi : R
I
+ → R specifying retailer i’s period
profit πgi (q) for any profile q of advertised prices given that competition clause policies g have been
7We remark that not any theoretical analysis of markets with capacity-constrained retailers follows this allocation rule.
For example, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) as well as Davidson and Deneckere (1986) assume that the market demand is
equally split among the duopolists whenever they set the same price and each duopolist has a capacity meeting at least
the half of the market demand. That is, both retailers have the same market share in this case regardless of their shares
of the total capacity. The same holds for the model of Tumennasan (2013), which is based on the framework of Kreps and
Scheinkman (1983).
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implemented is referred to as retailer i’s profit mapping under clause profile g. To simplify the
notation, we write πi instead of π
w
i . Obviously, πi(q) = (qi − c)Xi(q) for any profile q of advertised
prices.
The outcome of our competition game summarizes all actions which the retailers have chosen
during the course of the game. An outcome is also called a terminal history and is represented by a
sequence o := (ot)
∞
t=−1 := (g, q
0, q1, · · · ) where g indicates the competition clause policy selected in
period t = −1 and qt the prices advertised in period t. The retailers are assumed to discount their











be the set of possible game outcomes. The mapping Πi : O → R specifying
the total profit of retailer i for any game outcome is called the total profit mapping of retailer i.
We remark that the common discount factor δ is allowed to take the value of zero. At δ = 0, the
retailers do not value future profits. In this case, our competition game transforms itself - in essence
- into a two-stage game where the price competition phase consists of only one stage. Obviously,
it then holds Πi(o) := π
g
i (q
0) for any game outcome o := (g, q0, . . . ) ∈ O. While δ > 0 could be
interpreted as a situation in which the end date of the competition is not foreseeable by the retailers,
δ = 0 represents the situation in which the end date is commonly known.8 Our analysis takes into
consideration both situations.
An outcome in which each retailer advertises the collusive price pm in each period of the price
competition phase is referred to as a collusive outcome. As can be easily checked, if a collusive
outcome om := (g, q0, q1, . . . ) is realized, i.e., qtj = p
m for any period t ∈ Z+ and any retailer j ∈ I,




1− δ κi π
m − 1Ci(gi) f.
An outcome in which each retailer advertises a price equal to marginal costs c in each period
of the price competition phase is referred to as a competitive outcome. Obviously, if a competitive
outcome op := (g, q0, q1, . . . ) is realized, i.e., qtj = c for any period t ∈ Z+ and any retailer j ∈ I,
then retailer i earns a total profit in the amount of
Πi(o
p) = −1Ci(gi) f,
i.e., retailer i incurs a total profit of zero in case it has not adopted a CC, and a loss of f otherwise.
2.3 Business Policies
The rules of our extended capacity-constrained Bertrand competition game we detailed in the pre-
ceding subsections are summarized by Γ(δ, f, n, z) or, simply, by Greek capital letter Γ whenever
no specific reference is made to the parameters of the game. In the remainder of this section, we
introduce formal terms by which we describe the possible courses of our competition game and the
strategies available for the retailers. Our notation mainly follows the one proposed in Chapter 6 of
the textbook of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for multi-stage games with perfect information.
8We note that it suffices for our purposes to represent the competition games with finite horizon by two-stage competition
games. Resorting to backward induction arguments, one can show that a subgame perfect price policy inducing the collusive
price in any of the finitely many stages of the price competition phase exists if, and only if, the collusive price constitutes
a Nash equilibrium in the single-stage price competition phase. Therefore, the results obtained in competition games with
finite horizon are by nature equal to the ones obtained in the two-stage competition games.
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A history up to period t is a sequence enumerating the actions chosen by the retailers until period
t. Let ht be such a history and pick some period t0 ≤ t and some retailer i ∈ I. The component
hti,t0 of h




i,t0)i∈I lists the actions of all retailers in period t0 according to history h
t.
We recursively define H−1 := G and Ht := Ht−1 ×RI+ for any t ∈ Z+. Apparently, Ht consists
of all possible histories up to period t. Moreover, we define singleton H−2 := {∅} where ∅ stands for
the initial history (starting point) of our competition game. The set of all non-terminal histories is
denoted by H := ∪∞t=−2Ht.
Let us choose some history h ∈ Ht0 and pick some period t ≥ t0. A history ht ∈ Ht is said to
be consistent with history h whenever the actions in the periods up to t0 of history h
t correspond to
those of history h, i.e., hti,s = hi,s for any i ∈ I and any s ≤ t0. We recursively define Ht0h := {h}




+ for any period t ≥ t0. Apparently, Hth represents the set of histories up to
period t consistent with history h and Hh := ∪∞t=t0H
t
h represents the set of all non-terminal histories
consistent with history h. To simplify our notation, if h := (g) ∈ H−1, then we simply write Hg
instead of H(g).
A strategy or, synonymously, a business policy of retailer i is a complete plan of action. It
prescribes the actions retailer i takes for any conceivable history. More precisely, it specifies which
competition clause policy retailer i selects at the beginning of the game and, for any history ht−1 ∈
Ht−1 and t ∈ Z+, which price retailer i would advertise in period t if he observed the previous actions
ht−1. In formal terms, a business policy of retailer i is described as a mapping si : H → Gi ∪ R+
where si(∅) ∈ Gi and si(ht−1) ∈ R+ for any ht−1 ∈ Ht−1 and t ∈ Z+. The set of business policies
available for retailer i is denoted by Si.
A business policy profile s := (si)i∈I lists the business policies chosen by all retailers. We denote
the set of these profiles by S := ×i∈ISi. The outcome induced by business policy profile s is the
infinite sequence of actions realized by retailers pursuing these policies. It is specified by
o(s) := (s(∅), s(s(∅)), s(s(s(∅))), . . . ) .
Let us consider some non-initial history h ∈ Ht. The outcome induced by history h and business
policy profile s is defined as
oh(s) := (h, s(h), s(s(h)), . . . ).
It describes the actions recorded by history h for the periods up to t and afterwards the actions the
retailers would choose in the succeeding periods if they experienced history h before.
We denote the subgame of Γ starting after history h by Γh and the restriction of business policy
si on Hh by s
h
i . The latter mapping specifies the actions of retailer i only for histories which are
consistent with history h. Apparently, the set of these restrictions constitutes the business policy set
of retailer i in subgame Γh. In line with the above rule of notational simplification, if h := (g) ∈ H−1,
we simply write Γg and sgi instead of Γ
(g) and s
(g)
i , respectively. Mapping s
g
i is called the price policy
of retailer i in subgame Γg. With slight abuse of notation, we sometimes express business policy si
of retailer i by (gi, (s
g̃
i )g̃∈G). Correspondingly, a business policy profile is sometimes expressed by
(g, (sg̃)g̃∈G) where g := (gi)i∈I and s
g̃ := (sg̃i )i∈I .





pm if either t = 0 or ht−1i,t0 = p
m for any period 0 < t0 < t and any i ∈ I,
c otherwise,
for any ht−1 ∈ Ht−1g and any t ∈ Z+. The grim-trigger price policy states that the retailer advertises
the collusive price pm at the beginning of the price competition phase and continues to advertise this
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price as long as all retailers have advertised the collusive price in any preceding period. However, if
the latter is not satisfied, the retailer advertises the competitive price c. We henceforth denote the
grim-trigger price policy of retailer i in subgame Γg by tgi . Obviously, if the retailers realize clause
profile g and adopt grim-trigger price policies tg := (tgi )i∈I in subgame Γ
g, then the collusive outcome
(g, pm, pm, . . . ) results.




for any ht−1 ∈ Ht−1g and any t ∈ Z+. The competitive price policy states that the retailer always
advertises a price equal to the marginal costs regardless of the prices advertised in the preceding peri-
ods. We henceforth denote the competitive price policy of retailer i in subgame Γg by cgi . Apparently,
if the retailers realize clause profile g and adopt competitive price policies cg := (cgi )i∈I in subgame
Γg, then the competitive outcome (g, c, c, . . . ) results.
3 Perfectly Collusive Clause Profiles
In his seminal work, Salop (1986) pointed out that MCCs can be used as a device facilitating collusive
outcomes. This remarkable finding is revisited in our paper where several aspects of commercial
activities not considered in Salop (1986) are taken into account. Indeed, our more multifaceted setup
allows us to go beyond the fundamental issue raised by Salop (1986) and to study the form and spread
of collusive CCs in retail markets.
Compared to the analysis of Salop (1986), the set of CC options available for the retailers is
substantially extended in our setting. The MCC is here assumed to be just one of the CCs a retailer
is able to implement. This extension is motivated by earlier empirical studies like those of Arbatskaya
et al. (2004) and Arbatskaya et al. (2006) which suggest that other forms of CCs than the MCC are
also popular among the retailers. Interestingly, our analysis shows that even though the MCC fails
to be collusive efficacious, other CCs such as the BCCs with lump sum refunds might not.
Another distinguishing feature is the assumed number of retailers. While Salop (1986) discusses
the collusive efficacy of the MCC only for the duopoly case, we do not impose restrictions on the
number of the competing retailers, except that we rule out the monopoly case. Such generalization
allows us to gain insights about to which extent the CCs have to be implemented in the retail market
to render them collusively effective.
One of our main results is that a collusive outcome can be achieved even if just some (or in some
cases just one) of the retailers adopt CCs. This proposition is line with the general observation in real
business life that not all retailers in the market implement CCs; on this see e.g. the market surveys
in Moorthy and Zhang (2006) and Jiang et al. (2017). Nevertheless, it is at odds with most of the
earlier theoretical studies on CCs like the ones of Doyle (1988), Logan and Lutter (1989), and Corts
(1995) claiming that an all retailers encompassing implementation of CCs is required to unleash the
collusive potential of CCs.
A further peculiarity of our competition model with CCs is that the retailers are assumed to be
heterogeneous with regard to their sales capacities. As will be argued later, such heterogeneity might
induce specific patterns in the spread of CCs. To the best of our knowledge, the paper of Tumennasan
(2013) and our paper are so far the only ones examining the relationship between capacity size and
competition clause policy.
The following analysis of the retailers’ business policies is based on the solution concept of subgame
perfectness. Since retailers are assumed to interact infinitely often, non-compliant behavior can be
punished by retaliatory measures of the competitors in the future. To simplify our analysis, we
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focus only on those subgame perfect business policies using grim-trigger price policies in the price
competition phases whenever possible and competitive price policies otherwise.
3.1 Definition and Alternative Characterizations
The set of the subgame perfect equilibria in our competition game Γ is denoted by S(Γ). As just
mentioned, we narrow down the solution set by imposing the restriction
Sg(Γ) :=
{
s ∈ S(Γ) : sg =
{




The business policies of solution set Sg(Γ) have the characteristic that grim-trigger price policies
are implemented in a price competition phase whenever they prove to be subgame perfect in this
subgame. Otherwise, the retailers pursue the competitive price policy. Obviously, the grim-trigger
price policies unleash the most severe punishment for defecting from the collusion.
Although restricting the set of solutions to Sg is a substantial simplification, it is by far not a
peculiarity of our analysis. Such simplification has been made in the theory of partial cartels, like in
the models of Escrihuela-Villar (2008) as well as Bos and Harrington (2010) to name a few. Moreover,
it has also been proposed by Liu (2013) for the analysis of competition clause policies. Notably, this
restriction does not cause existence problems; without difficulty, one can show that solution set Sg(Γ)
is non-empty for any competition game Γ.
As the scope of our analysis is restricted to those business policies, we exclusively reserve the term
subgame perfectness to business policy profiles belonging to Sg(Γ). A clause profile ĝ := (ĝi)i∈I is said
to be subgame perfect in Γ, if there exists a subgame perfect business policy profile ŝ := (ĝ, (sg)g∈G)
in Γ, i.e., ŝ ∈ Sg(Γ). As will be argued later, to characterize solution set Sg(Γ), we need to calculate
the critical discount factor for any subgame Γg.
The critical discount factor of retailer i at clause profile g is defined as






δ ∈ [0, 1[ : 1








In words, the critical discount factor δgi,crit of retailer i at clause profile g corresponds to the lowest
discount factor for which the collusive profit of retailer i does not fall short of the highest one-
stage profit this retailer can attain by defecting given that clause profile g has been adopted and all
competitors of retailer i advertise collusive price pm.
The critical discount factor at clause profile g is defined as the maximum individual critical
discount factor at this profile, i.e.,
δgcrit := max{δ
g
i,crit : i ∈ I}.
In accordance with the previous notational simplifications, we omit the superscript of the critical
discount factors if g = w. The following remark summarizes some useful characteristics of the
maximum one-stage profit retailer i can attain by defecting from the collusive behavior.

















−i) ≤ (pm − c) max{ki, D(pm)}
for any retailer i ∈ I and any clause profile g ∈ G.
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The two parts of this remark substantially simplify the calculation of the maximum one-stage
profit attainable by defection. Parts (a) and (b) provide a lower and an upper bound for this profit,
respectively. Moreover, according to part (a), it suffices for the calculation to consider only the
advertised prices above the marginal costs.
It turns out that if none of the retailers have adopted a CC (i.e., g = w) in the implementation
phase, the critical discount factor for retailer i is given as follows.








for any retailer i ∈ I and any clause profile g ∈ G.








for any clause profile g ∈ G. This means, the critical discount factor for clause profile w is the greatest
among the critical discount factors; or putting differently, the adoption of CCs never increases the
critical discount factor.
As can be easily checked, our competition game Γ is a multi-stage game being continuous at
infinity. We know from Theorem 3.2 in the textbook of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) that the One-
Shot Deviation Principle holds for such games. This principle provides a simple characterization
of subgame perfect equilibria. It states that a strategy profile is subgame perfect if, and only if, there
exists no profitable one-shot deviation for each subgame and each player.9 Applying this principle to
competition game Γ, we obtain the following characterization of solution concept Sg.








for any i ∈ I and g ∈ G,
(T2) Πi(o(ŝ) ≥ Πi(o(s̃)) for any s̃ := (s̃i, ŝ−i) ∈ S where s̃i := (g̃i, (ŝgi )g∈G) and any i ∈ I
are satisfied.
The focus of our interest is whether solution set Sg(Γ) contains business policy profiles inducing
collusive price outcomes. We call such profiles perfectly collusive and, henceforth, denote this subset
of Sg(Γ) by
Sm(Γ) := {s ∈ Sg(Γ) : o(s) is a collusive price outcome}.
A clause profile ĝ := (ĝi)i∈I is said to be perfectly collusive in Γ whenever there exists some business
policy profile ŝ := (ĝ, (ŝg)g∈G) ∈ Sm(Γ).
As will be shown next, such clause profiles can be characterized by three conditions; two refer only
to the common discount factor and the remaining one also to the implementation costs. With regard
to the latter condition, it turns out to be helpful to introduce the notion of the critical implementation





m if C(g) 6= ∅ where i := min C(g),
+∞ otherwise.
This value gives the collusive profit of the smallest CC-adopting retailer. Obviously, whenever the
actual implementation costs exceed fg,δcrit, then this retailer would be better off at the competitive
outcome without implementing a CC than at the collusive outcome with implementing a CC.
9For further details of this principle, we refer to the proof of Remark 3.
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Remark 4. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). A clause profile ĝ is perfectly collusive if, and only if, properties
(M1) δĝcrit ≤ δ
(M2) δ < δgcrit for any g := (wi, ĝ−i) ∈ G and any i ∈ C(g),
(M3) f ≤ f ĝ,δcrit
are satisfied
The three properties of Remark 4 completely characterize the perfectly collusive clause profiles
and correspond to the conditions of external and internal stability in the partial cartel theory, see
D’Aspremont et al. (1983). Property (M1) covers the external stability of the collusive clause
profile: None of the non CC-adopting retailers has an incentive to adopt a CC as the collusive
outcome is already reached and, thus, the implementation of a CC would turn out to be a costly
business operation without any additional gain for them. Properties (M2) and (M3) ensure the
internal stability of the collusive clause profile: None of the CC-adopting retailers prefers repealing
the CC. Such withdrawal would induce a competitive outcome; with the consequence that none of
them would be better off.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss whether a collusive price outcome can be achieved for
any arbitrary common discount factor and, if so, which kinds of conventional clause profiles could
sustain such outcome. It turns out that the characterization of perfectly collusive clause profiles put
forward in Remark 4 becomes very useful for tackling these issues.
3.2 Collusion without Competition Clauses
This subsection provides a first insight into the incentives of the retailers to adopt CCs. As will be
demonstrated next, the adoption of CCs proves to be a sufficient, but not a necessary condition for
inducing collusion.
Proposition 5. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). There exists no subgame perfect business policy profile in
which a retailer adopts a CC, but which induces the competitive outcome.
According to this proposition, the only purpose of CCs in our competition model is achieving a
collusive outcome. This result relies on our implicit assumption that all consumers know all advertised
prices and competition clause policies. If this assumption is dropped, CCs could be adopted for other
reasons like signaling low prices or price differentiating between customers with low and high costs
in searching out the prices charged by other retailers.10
Jain and Srivastava (2000), Moorthy and Winter (2006), as well as Moorthy and Zhang (2006)
have strongly put forward the former purpose. Earlier studies advocating the later purpose are the
ones of Png and Hirshleifer (1987), Corts (1997), Chen et al. (2001), and Hviid and Shaffer (2012).
In these studies, some exogenously determined groups of consumers are able to take advantage of
CCs while others are not. More recent studies like the ones of Janssen and Parakhonyak (2013),
Yankelevich and Vaughan (2016), and Jiang et al. (2017) have endogenized the price search of the
consumers to motivate CCs as a device enabling price discrimination.
Interestingly, as parts of this literature suggest, if CCs are used as a signaling or price discriminat-
ing device, then CCs could have pro-competitive and welfare-enhancing effects, reducing (some of)
the effective sales prices and making better off not only the retailers but also (at least some groups
of) consumers.11 This finding however is in contrast to our Proposition 5, which rules out any other
purpose than enforcing collusion.
10Other reasons why retailers adopt CCs could be mentioned. Hviid (2010) provides a comprehensive overview of the
different motivations for CCs discussed in the scientific literature.
11An opposite point of view has been taken e.g. by Budzinski and Kretschmer (2011). They claim that CCs still induce the
collusive price even though there is asymmetric information among the consumers about the price policies of the retailers.
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Moreover, we remark that the converse of Proposition 5 does not hold. It turns out that if the
common discount factor is sufficiently large, the collusive outcome is achieved only without CCs.
Theorem 6. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). It holds:
(a) If clause profile w (i.e. the clause profile in which none of the retailers adopts a CC) is perfectly
collusive, then δcrit ≤ δ < 1.
(b) If δcrit ≤ δ < 1, then clause profile w is the only perfectly collusive clause profile.
The Perfect Folk Theorem put forward by Friedman (1971) states that player can reach
collusive outcomes in infinitely repeated games whenever the common discount factor is sufficiently
large. According to Theorem 6, this fundamental result remains valid even for our extended Bertrand
competition game where CCs can be adopted by the retailers at the beginning. This is due to the fact
that if the retailers value future profits sufficiently high, then the threats implicit in the grim-trigger
price policies are efficacious and deter the retailers from undercutting monopoly price pm. In this
case, adopting CCs causes only undue costs.
However, as can be easily concluded from Remarks 2 and 3, the retailers would choose the
competitive price policy in the price competition phase if the common discount factor δ were below
threshold δcrit and none of them had adopted a CC. For such discount factors, the mere grim-trigger
threats are too weak to sustain collusion. Whether collusion can then be facilitated through the
implementation of CCs, is studied in the remaining parts of this section.
3.3 Collusive Competition Clauses with Lump Sum Refunds
A strong argument against the collusive efficacy of CCs has been put forward by Hviid and Shaffer
(1994) and Corts (1995). They show that CCs are collusively ineffective if the competition between
the retailers is described as a one-stage game in which the retailers decide simultaneously about the
competition clause policies and the advertised prices.12 However, the robustness of their results might
be questionable. It turns out that their conclusion cannot easily transferred to our setting as our
modeling of the competition differs from those in two core aspects.
First, the timing of the decision-making in our framework is different. We consider competition
clause policies as binding commitments and therefore describe the competition between retailers as
a sequential-move game in which before fixing the prices, the retailers announce their competition
clause policies. That means, when the retailers advertise the prices, they have already been informed
about the competition clause policies pursued by their competitors. Second, our setting allows for a
longer time horizon. We take into account that retailers might compete with each other repeatedly
(i.e., finitely often until a unknown end point) so that non-cooperative behavior of a retailer can be
punished by non-cooperative behavior of its competitors in future periods.
As will be demonstrated below, these divergences from the settings of Hviid and Shaffer (1994) and
Corts (1995) are responsible for a different answer regarding the efficacy of CCs. More specifically, for
sufficiently small hassle and implementation costs, clause profiles in which a sufficiently large coalition
of retailers adopt CCs with well-proportionate lump sum refunds prove to be perfectly collusive in
our competition model.
12See Proposition 2 of Hviid and Shaffer (1994) and Proposition 2 of Corts (1995). It should be noted that the scope
of their results are different. Hviid and Shaffer (1994) prove the claim for any heterogeneous Bertrand duopoly in which
the MCC and the BCCs with refund factors on the price difference (“We promise that if we do not offer the lowest price
in the market, we’ll beat it by an amount equal to x % of the difference between our announced price and the lowest price
in the market.”) are the only CCs available for the retailers. Corts (1995) proves the claim for any homogeneous Bertrand
oligopoly in which the CCs can take on a wide variety of forms including the conventional ones.
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One reason why CCs nevertheless might fail to facilitate collusion even in our setting is that the
total capacity of the CC-adopting retailers is too small in order to punish defectors. Indeed, if the
total capacity of those retailers does not meet the market demand at the monopoly price, each of
them faces the same incentive to defect from the collusion as if they had not adopted CCs. The
subsequent remark sets this point our and states that the critical discount factors of such clause
profiles correspond to the one of the trivial clause profile.
Remark 7. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). It holds
δgcrit = δcrit
for any clause profile g satisfying KC(g) ≤ D(pm).
An immediate consequence of this remark is that adopting a CC is pointless whenever the total
capacity of the CC-adopting retailers does not exceed the market demand at the monopoly price. We
summarize this finding in the following theorem.
Theorem 8. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z) where δ < δcrit. Any clause profile g satisfying KC(g) ≤ D(pm) is
not perfectly collusive.
Another well-known reason why CCs become collusively ineffective are hassle costs. Such costs
drive a wedge between the effective purchase and sales prices whenever the CC is exercised. This
wedge might entail that a defecting retailer can undersell any of its competitors, including the ones
which have adopted a CC. Even if the sales prices at those competitors are below the reduced price
advertised by the defector, the purchase prices at them might exceed this advertised price due to the
hassle costs. In such a case, the CC-adopting retailers are unable to immediately penalize defections
from collusive behavior, with the consequence that the CCs become collusively ineffective.
Apart from that, even though collusive behavior can be enforced by CCs, retailers nevertheless
might abstain from offering them if their implementation is too expensive. Obviously, if the implemen-
tation costs exceed the additional profit gained by acting collusively instead of acting competitively,
then the retailer would be better off without CC.
In the following, we aim to be more specific about the consequences of the hassle and imple-
mentation costs on the collusive efficacy of CCs. In particular, we seek to provide thresholds of the
hassle and implementation costs above which collusion is not enforceable by CCs. For this purpose,
additional notation is required.
To specify the threshold for the hassle costs, we define mapping π̄i(·) where
π̄i(p) := (p− c) min{ki, D(p)}
for any p ∈ R+ and any retailer i ∈ I. Apparently, mapping π̄i(·) gives the profit earned by retailer
i if the customers of retailer i pay a price p and the customers of the other retailers a price above p.
Henceforth, we refer to mapping π̄i as the monopolistic profit mapping of retailer i. We are interested
in the price p̄δi for which the monopolistic profit of retailer i corresponds to the total (net) surplus
retailer i attains at the collusive outcome.
Remark 9. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). For any retailer i ∈ I and any common discount factor δ < δi,crit,








m. Moreover, the conditions
(i) p̄βi < p̄
δ
i
(ii) p̄δj ≤ p̄δi
are satisfied for any common discount factors β < δ and any retailers j ≤ i.
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Based on price p̄δi , we define
µ̄δi := p
m − p̄δi , φ̄δi :=
pm−p̄δi
pm
, z̄δi := p̄
δ
i − c
for any δ < δi,crit and any i ∈ I. Due to Remark 9, these values are positive. Moreover, this remark
implies that µ̄δi and φ̄
δ
i is decreasing in δ and non-increasing in i, whereas z̄
δ
i is increasing in δ and
non-decreasing in i.
To specify the threshold for the implementation costs, we consider the greatest number j ∈ I so
that the coalition consisting of the n+ 1− j largest retailers has a total capacity meeting the demand





for any common discount factor δ < δcrit. Apparently, f̄
δ is the total net surplus the retailer with
the lowest capacity in coalition Ik achieves at the collusive price outcome. We hint that Assumption
(D4) ensures f̄δ ≥ 1
1−δκ2π
m.
The following theorem provides thresholds for the hassle and implementation costs above which
CCs become an inefficacious device for collusion.
Theorem 10. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z) where δ < δcrit. If f > f̄
δ or z > z̄δ1, then there is no perfectly
collusive clause profile.
Theorems 8 and 10 point towards two technical issues preventing CCs to induce collusive behav-
ior, a too small total capacity of the CC adopting retailers and too large hassle or implementation
costs. It remains to examine the collusive efficacy of CCs in cases these technical barriers do not
prevail. We address this issue by focusing on the conventional clause profile, i.e., in which the retailers
adopt CCs with lump sum refunds.
Our first finding is that CCs with lump sum refunds less than the hassle costs are avoided by the
retailers in any circumstance. The reason for this obvious. Since such CCs do not cause a matching
or an undercutting of the defector’s price reduction, they do not remove the incentive of the retailers
to deviate from collusive behavior. Hence, such CCs prove to be ineffective in punishing defectors.
Theorem 11. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z). There exists no perfectly collusive clause profile in which a
retailer adopts a CC with lump sum refund µ < z.
One interesting aspect of the last theorem is that it also reproduces the inefficacy result of Hviid
and Shaffer (1999) for the case of perfectly homogeneous commodities. As stated in the above
theorem, if hassle costs exists, MCCs turn out to be ineffective in facilitating collusion no matter how
small these costs are. Due to this disruptive effect, hassle costs have been referred to as the Achilles’
heel of the MCCs by Hviid and Shaffer (1999).
This pro-competitive effect of hassle costs has also been experimentally tested by Dugar and
Sorensen (2006). Their setting essentially corresponds to ours with common discount factor δ = 0.
An augmented homogeneous Bertrand trioloply is played where the three players decide in the first
stage whether they adopt the MCC and set the price of the commodity in the second stage. It is
assumed that (at least some of) the customers incur hassle costs in exercising the MCC. Dugar and
Sorensen (2006) report that if exercising the MCC is tedious for any customer, then the average
effective price is close to the one resulting from the games without the MCC option.
We remark that the ineffectiveness result of Theorem 11 hings crucially on the assumptions of
perfectly homogeneous commodity markets and simultaneous price-setting. If these assumptions are
dropped, then it might be the case that some of the CCs mentioned in the theorem become collusively
efficacious. Indeed, based on the Hotelling’s linear city model with sequential price-setting, it is shown
by Trost (2016) that MCCs prove to be collusively efficacious even if hassle costs prevail and by Pollak
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(2017) that CCs with negative lump sum refunds (so-called CCs with markups) prove to be collusively
efficacious in the case that no hassle costs prevail.
Let us now consider clause profiles in which a sufficiently large coalition of retailers adopts CCs
with lump sum refunds in the amount of the hassle costs. Lower and upper bounds of their critical
discount factors are presented in the following remark.
Remark 12. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z) where δ < δcrit and z ≤ z̄δ1. It holds:
(a) If clause profile g := (be,zJ , w−J) satisfies KJ > D(p
m), then
δgcrit ≥ 1− κJ
where equality holds if z ≤ z̄1−κJ1 .
(b) If clause profile g := (be,zJ , w−J) satisfies κJ ≥ 1− δ, then
δgcrit ≤ δ
where equality holds if, and only if, κJ = 1− δ or z = z̄δ1.
Applying this remark, we conclude that such clause profiles facilitate collusion for discount values
below threshold δcrit even though (“mild”) implementation and hassle costs exist.
Theorem 13. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z) where δ < δcrit and z ≤ z̄δ1. The non-trivial clause profile
ĝ := (ge,zJ , w−J) (i.e., the clause profile in which the retailers of non-empty coalition J ⊆ I adopt
CCs with lump sum refund z while the other retailers do not adopt CCs) is perfectly collusive if and
only if the conditions
(i) 1− κJ ≤ δ,
(ii) δ < 1− κJ\{j} where j := min J ,
(iii) f ≤ f ĝ.δcrit
are satisfied.
The conditions of this theorem are easy to interpret. Condition (i) represents the external stability
condition of the collusive clause profiles. It states that the sum of the market shares of the non CC-
adopting retailers has to be lower or equal to the common discount factor. Conditions (ii) and (iii)
represent the internal stability condition of the collusive clause profiles. The former states that the
sum of the market shares of the non CC-adopting retailers has to be large enough so that it would
exceed the common discount factor if the market share of one of CC-adopting retailers were added.
The anti-competitive prediction of Theorem 13 has already been experimentally tested by Dugar
(2007) for the specific case in which the price competition phase consists only of one stage (i.e.,
δ = 0) and no hassle costs exist (i.e., z = 0). The benchmark case of this experiment was a standard
homogeneous Bertrand triopoly game and the treatment case the two-stage game in which the three
players had the option to implement the MCC before competing in the Bertrand game. In line with
the prediction of the theorem, it was observed that all three players adopted the MCC in the majority
of the treatment cases and the average effective price in the treatment cases was significantly higher
than in the benchmark cases.
The essential point of Theorem 13 is that it challenges two fundamental claims made in several
theoretical studies on collusive CCs. First, in the case that retailers do not take into account future
profits (i.e., δ = 0), we infer from this theorem that the collusive price outcome is realized if all
retailers adopt CCs with lump sum refund z. However, this results is at odds with Proposition
2 in Corts (1995) according to which no business policy profile can substantiate supracompetitive
19
Version: June 11, 2021
prices. The reason for this divergence is that competition clause policies and prices are advertised
simultaneously in the model of Corts (1995), whereas in our setting the competition clause policies
are considered as binding commitments and are set before the prices are advertised.13
Second, if δ > 0, collusive behavior might occur even though only a few retailers adopt CCs with
lump sum refund z. In particular, in the absence of hassle costs, a partial adoption of MCCs might
suffice to induce collusive behavior. In contrast to our result, Proposition 1.C in Doyle (1988),
Theorem 1 in Logan and Lutter (1989), as well as Claim 2 in Corts (1995) state that a necessary
condition for making MCCs collusively efficacious is that they have to be adopted by all retailers.
Only few research papers like the ones of Belton (1987), Hviid and Shaffer (1999) as well as
Hviid and Shaffer (2010) agree with ours that partial adoption of CCs might be consistent with
collusive intentions. However, those papers take for granted some market asymmetries or extended
forms of competition clause policies. Belton (1987) assumes sequential price-setting; the retailers not
adopting a CC advertise the price after the CC-adopting retailers have advertised theirs. The crucial
assumption of the model of Hviid and Shaffer (1999) is that the retailers are spatially differentiated
and face strong asymmetric cost or demand conditions. Hviid and Shaffer (2010) consider competition
clause policies which combine the MCC with the retroactive most-favored customer clause (MFC).
A merit of our analysis is that one has not to invoke such market asymmetries or additional
provisions in the competition clauses to reconcile the theory of CCs with the striking empirical
finding that in most commodity markets only a few retailers adopt CCs. We conclude this section by
providing a numerical market example illustrating this salient feature of our competition model.
3.4 A Market Example
Let us assume throughout the remaining part of this section that the retail market of our competition
model can be described as follows.
Example. The retail market is a Bertrand market whose demand side is summarized by market
demand mapping D(p) := max{1 − p, 0}. The residual market demand results from a rationing rule










, and k4 :=
11
10
. Each retailer produces at marginal costs of zero (i.e.,
c = 0) and is faced with a demand resulting from Assumption (I). The common discount factor of





incur hassle costs 0 ≤ z ≤ 1
10
if they exercise CCs.
Apparently, the market demand mapping of this example satisfies our Assumptions (D1) - (D4).
The monopoly price is equal to pm = 1
2
so that the monopoly profit corresponds to πm = 1
4
. The
market capacity amounts to K = 25
10










, and κ4 =
44
100
. As can be easily checked, it holds f ≤ 1
1−δκ1π
m and z ≤ z̄01 = 110 .
Table I displays the critical discount factors as well as the critical implementation costs of all
perfectly collusive clause profiles in which each of the CC-adopting retailers chooses the CC with the
lump sum refund equal to the hassle costs. The critical discount factor of the trivial clause profile
is calculated according to the formula presented in Remark 2. Since z ≤ z̄01 , we can make use of
the formula presented in Remark 12(a) in order to specify the critical discount factors of the other
clause profiles.
In compliance with Theorem 6, collusion in the market is achieved without adopting CCs when-
ever δ ≥ δcrit = 80100 . Interestingly, as set forth in Theorem 13, collusion can be sustained even
though δ < 80
100
. However, for such common discount factors, at least some of the retailers have
13We note that Proposition 2 in Corts (1995) is derived from a set of available competition clause policies slightly
different from ours. However, one can easily show that the same conclusion results if our set G is assumed.
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Table I: CCs with lump sum refund z in our market example
to implement CCs. For example, we infer from Table I that the clause profile in which only the
retailer with the largest capacity adopts a CC with lump sum refund z induces collusive behavior for
56
100
≤ δ < 80
100
. Moreover, the collusive outcome can result at 20
100
≤ δ < 56
100
if the two retailers with
the largest capacities adopt CCs with lump sum refund z, and at 8
100
≤ δ < 20
100
if the three retailers
with the largest capacities adopt such CCs. Finally, for 0 ≤ δ < 8
100
, collusion can be realized by all
retailers adopting CCs with lump sum refund z.
The key message put forward by Table I is that collusive behavior can be enforced even though
only a few of the retailers adopt CCs. For example, if the customers incur no hassle costs and the
common discount factor of the retailers belongs to interval 8
100
≤ δ < 80
100
, collusion in the market is
achieved by partial adoption of MCCs. Remarkably, this observation is not in line with most of the
theoretical literature stating that MCCs sustain collusion only if all retailers adopt such clauses and
the set of alternative CC options is substantially restricted. As mentioned above, the decisive factor
for this divergence is that the time horizon of the competition considered in our setting differs from
the one assumed in those studies. Unlike them, we view the competition between the retailers as an
infinitely repeated game.
4 Existence, Robustness, and Impossibility
In this section, we point to implications, refinements, and limitations of the results we derived in
the previous section. The focus of our previous analysis has been on the clause profiles in which the
CC-adopting retailers opt for the CC with the lump sum refund equal to the hassle costs. Let us
henceforth denote the set consisting of those clause profiles by Ge,z := {(ge,zJ , w−J) : J ⊆ I}. The
first issue we will address in this section is that of existence. We will examine whether collusion
can be enforced by such conventional clause profiles regardless of the value of the common discount
factor. As was argued above, this holds in the market example of Section 3.4. It remains to prove
whether the claim also holds in general.
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It turns out that if the hassle and implementation costs are “mild”, then there exists at least one
perfectly collusive clause profile in Ge,z for any common discount factor. Usually, several of those
conventional clause profiles prove to be perfectly collusive. Since some of them seem to be more
plausible than others, we impose additional requirements on the clause profiles in order to single out
the most reasonable ones. As will be seen, these additional requirements lead to a unique solution in
Ge,z. Interestingly, this clause profile has a salient spreading pattern of the CCs.
Finally, we will take a glimpse beyond the clause profiles of Ge,z and examine the issue whether
other (conventional) clause profiles could induce collusion. By revisiting the market example of
Section 3.4, we will see that conventional clause profiles with a greater lump sum refund are also
perfectly collusive. Remarkably, some of them induce collusion in a more cost-saving way (i.e., with
a smaller number of CC-adopting retailers) than the ones of with lump sum refunds equal to the
hassle costs. We already know that the latter clause profiles are perfectly collusive regardless of the
underlying rationing rule. However, a complete explicit description of all perfectly collusive clause
profiles is in general not possible without any further reference to the underlying rationing rule.
 An Existence Result
The issue of existence is resolved by Theorems 6 and 13. These theorems ensure the non-emptiness
of solution concept Sm for sufficiently small implementation and hassle costs.
To see this result, we first note that fg,δcrit ≥
1
1−δκ1π
m for any clause profile g ∈ G. Moreover,
according to Remark 9, it holds z̄δ1 ≥ z̄01 for any 0 ≤ δ < δcrit. Therefore, it follows from Theorem
13 that collusion can be enforced by clause profiles of Ge,z for any common discount factor below δcrit
as long as the actual implementation and hassle costs do not exceed 1
1−δκ1π
m and z̄01 , respectively.
Apart from that, we know from Theorem 6 that collusion can result without any CCs if the common
discount factor is greater than or equal to δcrit. Putting these findings together, we obtain the
following existence result.
Corollary 14. If the implementation and hassle costs satisfy f ≤ κ1πm and z ≤ z̄01 , respectively, then
it holds for any common discount factor δ and any number of retailers n that solution set Sm(δ, f, n, z)
contains a business policy profile in which all CC-adopting retailers choose the CC with the lump sum
refund equal to hassle costs.
 A Uniqueness Result
According to the last result, if the hassle and implementation costs are sufficiently small, we find
a perfectly collusive clause profile in Ge,z for any common discount factor. However, it turns out
that Ge,z usually contains several perfectly collusive clause profile. For example, consider the market
described in Section 3.4 at common discount factor δ := 1
2
. As can be easily inferred from Theorem
13 and Table I, collusion is reached in this situation if the coalition of the CC-adopting retailers
belongs to system J := {{3, 4}, {2, 4}, {1, 4}, {1, 2, 3}} and each of the CC-adopting retailers chooses
the CC with the lump sum refund equal to the hassle costs.
To select the most plausible ones of these solutions, we impose two additional requirements. These
requirements are based on efficiency and robustness considerations and are lexicographically ranked.
The primary requirement is cost-efficiency and refers to the total implementation costs of a clause
profile, i.e., the sum of the implementation costs of all CC-adopting retailers. A perfectly collusive
clause profile is said to be a cost-efficient in Ge,z if it there is no other perfectly collusive clause
profile in Ge,z with lower total implementation costs (or synonymously, with a smaller number of
CC-adopting retailer). This requirement can be motivated by the argument that (tacitly) concerted
competition clause policies might be easier to realize the less retailers are involved.
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The secondary requirement is that of robustness. It is required that there be no other cost-efficient
clause profile in Ge,z with more permissible thresholds regarding the common discount factor or the
implementation costs, i.e., with a lower critical discount factor or greater critical implementation
costs. A clause profile fulfilling the two criteria is said to be robustly collusive in Ge,z. Applying this
refinement, we substantially narrow down the solutions in Ge,z.
Proposition 15. Consider Γ(δ, f, n, z) where δ < δcrit and z ≤ z̄01 . There exists a k ∈ I so that
clause profile (ge,zIk , w−Ik ) is the only robustly collusive one in G
e,z.
We obtain from this proposition and Corollary 14 a uniqueness result: For any common discount
factor, there is a unique robustly collusive clause profile in Ge,z. Remarkably, this clause profile has
a specific spreading pattern of the CCs; it is the one in which the CC-adopting retailers are the
retailers with the largest market shares. The robustly collusive clause profiles of Ge,z in the market
of Section 3.4 are printed in bold letters in Table I.
 An Impossibility Result
As shown in Corollary 14, we are able to provide a perfectly collusive clause profile in Ge,z for any
arbitrary common discount factor whenever hassle and implementation costs are sufficiently small.
This finding might immediately raise the question whether Ge,z encompasses all (conventional and)
perfectly collusive clause profiles. To clarify this issue, let us return to the retail market described in
Section 3.4 and consider several clause profiles in which a coalition of retailers adopts BCCs with
lump sum refund pm − c = 1
2
> z. The critical discount factors and critical implementation costs of
these clause profiles are listed in Table II.

















































Table II: BCCs with lump sum refund pm − c in our market example
Applying the three criteria stated in Remark 4, we infer from the values in the first row of Table
II that the clause profile in which the retailer with the largest capacity adopts a BCC with lump sum
refund pm − c is perfectly collusive whenever the common discount factor satisfies the inequalities
56
100
≤ δ < 80
100
. Interestingly, if one compares this result with the result derived in the second row of
Table I, one comes to the conclusion that it makes no difference whether this retailer adopts a CC
with lump sum z or with lump sum pm − c.
As indicated by the second row of Table II, collusive behavior can also achieved if the retailer
with the second largest capacity adopts such BCC. However, compared to the former clause profile,
this holds only for a smaller range of common discount factors and implementation costs.




if a BCC with lump sum refund pm − z is adopted by one of the two smallest retail-
ers. Therefore, such clause profiles do not cause collusive behavior. This finding is in accord with
Theorem 8 stating that if the total capacity of the CC adopting retailers does not meet the market
demand at the monopoly price, then the CCs are collusively ineffective.
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The fifth row of Table II reveals that for any common discount factor below 56
100
, collusion is
sustained by the clause profile in which the two retailers with the largest capacities adopt BCCs with
lump sum refund pm − c. The difference between this finding and the findings of Table I is striking.
According to Table I and Theorem 13, CCs with lump sum refund z have to be implemented by
more than two retailers in order to become collusive efficacious for common discount factors lower
than 20
100
. Hence, for such discount factors, the total implementation costs (i.e., the sum of the
implementation costs) necessary for achieving collusion is less if BCCs with lump sum refund pm − c
are adopted by the two largest retailers.
We conclude from these observations that Theorem 13 does not provide a complete list of the
perfectly collusive clause profile. But even more, there are market situations in which perfectly
collusive clause profiles not listed in the theorem are more cost-saving than the ones listed. Therefore,
in order to select the most plausible perfectly collusive CCs, it might be desirable to gain an overview
of all perfectly collusive CCs.
A characterization of the perfectly collusive clause profiles has already been given in Remark 4.
However, such implicit description of the solution set is of less value as no specific reference regarding
the form and spread of the collusive CCs is made. At least, it might be instructive to specify all
CCs with lump sum refunds of the solution set. However, as will be set forth next, such specification
proves to be an insurmountable exercise without any reference to the rationing rule underlying the
residual market demand.
To see this, let us revisit the market example of Section 3.4 and calculate the critical discount
factor of the clause profile in which both the retailer with the largest and the retailer with the smallest
capacity implement a BCC with lump sum refund pm − c. Unlike the critical discount factors of the
clause profiles presented in the previous two tables, this threshold depends on the underlying rationing
rule. To see this point, Table III lists the critical discount factors for the efficient, proportional, and
perfect rationing rule.
Clause profile g Critical discount factor δgcrit Critical implemen-
efficient proportional perfect tation costs fg,δcrit
(b
e, 12













Table III: Clause profile (b
e, 12
1 , w2, w3, b
e, 12
4 ) in our market example
To find out whether clause profile (b
e, 1
2
1 , w2, w3, b
e, 1
2
4 ) is perfectly collusive, we apply Remark 4.





), it remains to compare the critical discount factors of Table III with those of the first
and fourth row of Table II. In the case that the rationing rule is efficient, the clause profile proves





[. If the rationing rule is proportional, the range of the common discount factor





Remarkably, this clause profile is never perfectly collusive whenever the perfect rationing rule applies.
We conclude from these findings that it is impossible to specify (all conventional business policy
profiles of) the solution set of the market example in Section 3.4 without any reference to the
underlying rationing rule. This impossibility result is summarized in the following remark.
Remark 16. It is not always possible to specify all conventional business policy profiles of solution
set Sm(δ, f, n, z) without any further reference to the rationing rule underlying the residual market
demand.
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5 Concluding Remarks
In their empirical study of the incidence and variety of low price guarantees, Arbatskaya et al. (2004,
p. 321) point out: “Economic theory is silent on the topic of which guarantee is best because the
literature tends to posit static models of equilibrium in which no firm is ever ‘surprised’. In this
world, both types of guarantees [MCC and BCC] are equally effective at facilitating high prices, and
there are no grounds to choose one over the other.” The aim of our paper is to remedy this obvious
shortcoming in the theoretical literature on low price guarantees. We have modeled the competition
in the retail market as an infinite multi-stage game and have examined the form and spread of low
price guarantees within this game-theoretical framework.
The starting point of our competition model is a perfectly homogeneous commodity market in
which the retailers are identical except for their sales capacities. Their competition clause policies
have been considered as binding commitments. They are implemented at the initial stage of the
competition game, the so-called clause implementation phase, and remain unchanged in the subse-
quent stages. In each of those stages, the retailers compete in the commodity market and advertise
prices for the commodity. The effective prices the retailers charge for the commodity result from
those advertised prices and the implemented competition clause policies. The stages after the clause
implementation phase constitute the so-called price competition phase.
The implementation and exertion of competition clauses (CCs) might be costly in real life. There-
fore, such costs have been taken into account in our framework. More specifically, we have assumed
that the retailers adopting CCs incur the same fixed implementation costs and the customers exercis-
ing CCs incur the same hassle costs per purchased unit of the commodity. Since a substantial part of
the theoretical literature does not consider hassle costs, we have also examined the case of no hassle
costs for the sake of comparability.
Our multi-stage competition game is one with perfect information. When the retailers decide
about the prices at some stage in the price competition phase, they know all previous choices of
their competitors. The consumers are fully informed about the advertised prices and adopted com-
petition clause policies before they go shopping. The assumption of perfect information has serious
consequences. It entails that CCs are not implemented for other reasons than facilitating collusion.
The end date of the price competition phase might, however, be unknown to the retailers. For
this reason, we have viewed the price competition between them as an infinitely repeated game.
Future profits are discounted. In order to also include the cases in which the end date of the price
competition phase is foreseeable for the retailers, we have allowed for the possibility that the common
discount factor can take the value of zero.
To make predictions of the form and spread of collusive CCs, we have applied the solution concept
of subgame perfectness. Additionally, to simplify our analysis, we have assumed that the grim-
trigger price policies are pursued by the retailers in the price competition phase whenever these
policies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium in this subgame. Otherwise, the retailers pursue
the competitive price policies, i.e., they advertise prices equal to the marginal costs in each stage of
the price competition phase regardless of which prices have been advertised in the previous stages.
The first important result of our analysis has been that the Perfect Folk Theorem by Fried-
man (1971) can be transferred to our extended Bertrand competition game: Whenever the common
discount is sufficiently close to 1, collusive behavior of the retailers is enforceable without adopting
CCs (cf. Theorem 6). In such cases, the threats inherent in the grim-trigger price policies suffice
to induce collusion. However, those threats prove to be too weak whenever the common discount
factor is not sufficiently close to 1. One of the primary objectives of our paper is to examine whether
collusive behavior can be induced by the adoption of CCs for such common discount factors.
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Our analysis shows that CCs can be used by the retailers as a device facilitating collusion for
any of those discount factors. However, the collusive efficacy of CCs depends on several conditions
regarding the costs, spread, and form of the CCs. Regarding the latter, we have put special emphasis
on BCCs with lump sum refunds. Such BCCs are promises of the retailers that their customers are
entitled to purchase the commodity at the lowest advertised price in the market minus a refund in
the amount of x e whenever the retailers fail to advertise the lowest price in the market.
One necessary condition for the collusive efficacy of CCs is that the implementation and hassle
costs of the CCs are sufficiently small (cf. Theorem 10). If the implementation costs exceed the
total collusive profit of the largest retailer, then it proves to be unprofitable for any retailer to adopt
CCs even though such policy would induce collusion. On the other hand, if the implementation costs
do not exceed the total collusive profit of the smallest retailer, then the implementation costs are no
longer an obstacle for using CCs as a facilitating device.
High hassle costs render any CC collusively ineffective. This follows from our requirement that
the sales price guaranteed by a CC do not fall below the marginal costs whenever the advertised price
is not below the marginal costs. This assumption has been imposed in order to avoid unsustainable
situations in which the CC-adopting retailers incur losses if their customers exercise the CCs. How-
ever, if the hassle costs are “mild” so that any worthwhile price reduction by the smallest retailer can
be immediately undercut by the BCCs of its competitors, collusion becomes enforceable.
To sum up, we agree with Hviid and Shaffer (1999) that the MCC becomes collusively ineffective
in homogeneous retail markets whenever hassle costs exit (cf. Theorem 11). Nevertheless, we cannot
confirm their claim (see Section 4.4 in Hviid and Shaffer, 1999) that other CCs are also collusively
ineffective in this case. Indeed, it has been demonstrated that the collusive outcome can be enforced
if a sufficiently large coalition of retailers offers BCCs with lump sum refunds equal to the hassle costs
(cf. Theorem 13). The reason for this divergence is due to different assumptions regarding the timing
of the competition. Unlike our setting, Hviid and Shaffer (1999) view the retail market as a one-stage
game in which the retailers choose the competition clause policies and the prices simultaneously.
A further necessary condition for the collusive efficacy of CCs is that the total capacity of the
CC-adopting retailers has to be large enough to meet the market demand at the collusive price (cf.
Theorem 8). However, it is in general not required that all retailers have to adopt CCs in order to
enforce collusion, as claimed in most of the earlier theoretical papers on the CCs like in Doyle (1988)
and Logan and Lutter (1989). Some research papers agree with ours that partial adoption of CCs is
consistent with collusive intentions. However, those papers take for granted some asymmetries in the
market such as sequential price-setting or heterogeneous cost or demand conditions. A merit of our
paper is that one has not to resort to such asymmetries to reconcile the theory of collusive CCs with
the striking empirical finding that in most commodity markets only a few retailers adopt CCs.
From the above findings, we have inferred a general collusion existence theorem. If the hassle and
implementation costs are sufficiently small, then collusion is enforceable by a coalition of retailers
adopting the BCC with the lump sum refund equal to the hassle costs. This holds regardless of the
value of the common discount factor (cf. Corollary 14). However, usually there are several of such
collusion inducing coalitions where some exhibit a higher degree of plausibility than others.
To select the most plausible ones, we have substantially refined the solution concept of subgame
perfectness. Our primary selection criterion is cost-efficiency. It requires that the collusive outcome
be induced by minimal total implementation costs. This efficiency criterion could be justified by the
argument that tacit collusion might be more easily enforced the less the number of the CC-adopting
retailers is. In the second place, we require that the coalition induce the lowest critical discount factor
and the highest critical implementation costs. That means, it has to be the most robust with respect
to decreases in the common discount factor and increases in the implementation costs.
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Applying these refinement criteria, we have obtained a unique spreading pattern of collusively
effective CCs. It has turned out that if all CC-adopting retailers choose the BCC with the lump sum
refund equal to the hassle costs, then the most robust coalition is the one in which the retailers with
the largest market shares offer the CCs (cf. Proposition 15). Remarkably, this spreading pattern
proves to be independent of the rationing rule underlying the residual market demand.
The existence of collusive outcomes has been established by the (partial) adoption of BCCs with
lump sum refunds equal to the hassle costs. Nevertheless, it might be desirable to provide an explicit
description of all collusively effective forms of CCs. However, this task has proved to be insurmount-
able without further assumptions regarding the rationing rule (cf. Remark 16). This impossibility
result is due to the ambiguity that some forms of CCs are collusively efficacious for some rationing
rules, but not for others.
Although our theoretical analysis of the collusive efficacy of CCs is more general than most
previous ones, it has nevertheless some significant limitations which could be addressed in future
research projects. First, our analysis has been focused on the collusive efficacy of CCs with lump sum
refunds. However, as put forward by Arbatskaya et al. (2004), two other forms of CCs are also (or
even more) common in real commercial life, the CCs with a fixed refund factor on price differences
(“We promise that if we do not offer the lowest price in the market, we’ll beat it by an amount equal
to x % of the difference between our announced price and the lowest price in the market.”) and with
a refund factor on the minimum price (“We promise that if we do not offer the lowest price in the
market, we’ll beat it by x % .”). It might be interesting to know whether (the partial adoption of)
such CCs also induce collusion in our setting.
However, as we know from Remark 16, a complete description of all collusively efficacious CCs
is in general impossible without any further reference on the underlying rationing rule. A future
research project could address this problem. By tightening the solution concept and considering
specific settings of our competition model, it might be possible to explicitly specify at least all common
forms of CCs which induce collusion. For example, a promising approach might be to narrow down
the solution set to the most robust solutions; to impose additional, but reasonable requirements on
the rationing rules; and to focus on particular market structures.
Another worthwhile research issue might be to examine whether the most robust collusive solutions
have a common spreading pattern of the CCs. We already derived in Proposition 15 that if all CC-
adopting retailers choose BCCs with the lump sum refund equal to the hassle costs, the spreading
pattern of the CCs in the most robust solution is the one in which the retailers with the largest market
shares adopt the CCs. It is open question whether this salient spreading pattern of the collusive CCs
holds in general.
If this claim can be confirmed, one might have a simple demarcation criterion indicating whether
CCs are used by the retailers as a device facilitating collusion or for some other reasons. Usually,
the partial adoption of competition clauses has been interpreted as an indication that the adoption
of CCs relies on intentions others than the collusive one, e.g., to signal low price or to price differ-
entiate between uninformed loyals and well-informed shoppers; regarding this argument, see e.g. the
expositions in Section 3 in Moorthy and Winter (2006). However, as set forth in our paper, this
conclusion might not be justified in general. Rather, if the above claim holds, the market shares of the
CC-adopting retailers should be used as an indicative criterion for collusion. For example, collusive
intentions might prevail in markets where the CCs are adopted by dominant retailers. If only fringe
retailers offer CCs, the CCs might be implemented for other motives than collusion.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Remark 1.
(a) To prove this claim, we consider the situation in which clause profile g has been adopted and
retailer i advertises price qi 6= pm while its competitors advertise prices pm−i.
 Suppose qi > c. Due to Assumption (G), the effective sales price at retailer i amounts to q
s
i ≥ c














 Suppose qi ≤ c. Due to Assumption (G), the effective sales price at retailer i is qsi = qi so that
πgi (qi, p
m
−i) = (qi − c)Xi(qp) ≤ 0. Note that if qi = c, we have πgi (qi, p
m

















(b) To prove this claim, we consider the situation in which clause profile g has been adopted and
retailer i advertises price qi 6= pm while its competitors advertise prices pm−i.
 Suppose qi > p
m. Since retailer i’s competitors are assumed to advertise collusive price pm,
Assumption (G) implies that the effective purchase price charged by them is equal to pm. The
effective purchase price at retailer i can be either above or equal to or below pm.
In the first case, Assumptions (D2), (D4), (R1), and (I) imply that the demand for the product
offered by retailer i is zero. Hence, retailer i earns a profit πgi (qi, p
m




m − c) min{ki, D(pm)}
if qpi > p
m.
In the second case, Assumptions (R1) and (I) imply that retailer i sells quantity Xi(q
p) =
κiD(p
m) and, thus, earns a profit πgi (qi, p
m
−i) = (p
m − z − c)κiD(pm). Since z ≥ 0, we have
πgi (qi, p
m
−i) ≤ (pm − c)κiD(pm). Moreover, Assumption (D4) entails D(pm) < K so that




m − c) max{ki, D(pm)}
if qpi = p
m.
Finally, assume the last case. Due to Assumptions (R1) and (I), retailer i sells quantity
Xi(q






i − z− c) min{ki, D(q
p
i )}.
Since z ≥ 0, it holds πgi (qi, p
m
−i) ≤ (qpi − c) min{ki, D(q
p
i )}. Moreover, q
p
i < p
m entails (qpi −
c) min{ki, D(qpi )} < (p




m − c) min{ki, D(pm)}.
 Suppose qi < p
m. In this case, Assumption (G) implies that the effective purchase price
at retailer i corresponds to the advertised one, i.e., qpi = qi. Since retailer i’s competitors
advertise collusive price pm, it also follows from Assumption (G) that the effective purchase
prices charged by them are somewhere between c and pm. Due to Assumptions (R1) and (I),
the sales of retailer i is bounded from above by Xi(q




−i) ≤ (qi − c) min{ki, D(qi)} ≤ (pm − c) min{ki, D(pm)}.
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−i) ≤ (pm − c) min{ki, D(pm)}. 
Proof of Remark 2. Let us suppose clause profile w has been implemented, i.e., none of the retailers
has adopted a CC. Moreover, consider some retailer i advertising price qi < p
m. Since its competitors
are assumed to advertise collusive price pm, retailer i underbids all of them. Due to Assumptions
(R1) and (I), retailer i’s sales are then given by Xi(qi, p
m
−i) = min{ki, D(qi)} so that it earns a profit
πi(qi, p
m
−i) = (qi − c) min{ki, D(qi)}.
 Suppose ki ≤ D(pm). It follows from Assumption (D2) that πi(qi, pm−i) = (qi − c)ki. This
in turn implies supqi<pm πi(qi, p
m
−i) = (p
m − c)ki. Applying Remark 1(b), we even obtain
supqi 6=pm πi(qi, p
m
−i) = (p
m − c)ki. Since
1













 Suppose ki > D(p
m). It follows from Assumption (D1) that there is some ε > 0 so that
ki > D(qi) for any p
m − ε < qi < pm. This in turn implies Xi(qi, pm−i) = D(qi) for any




thus, limqi↑pm πi(qi, p
m
−i) = π














−i) ⇐⇒ δ ≤ 1− κi,
it holds δi,crit = min ∆i = 1− κi.













−i) ≤ (pm − c) min{ki, D(pm)} = supqi 6=pm πi(qi, p
m
−i). Therefore, we have
∆i :=
{
δ ∈ [0, 1[: 1









δ ∈ [0, 1[: 1








It immediately follows from ∆i ⊆ ∆gi that δi,crit ≥ δ
g
i,crit. 
Proof of Remark 3. To prove this remark, we resort to Theorem 3.2. of Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991). This theorem states that if a multi-stage game is continuous at infinity, then a strategy
profile is subgame perfect if, and only if, none of the players can increase its payoff in any subgame
through a one-shot deviation. This characterization of subgame perfectness is known as the One-
Shot Deviation Principle.
Our first step is to establish that this theorem is indeed applicable to our competition game.
Afterwards, the One-Shot Deviation Principle is formalized. We then apply this principle to
show that (i) the grim-trigger price policy profile tg is subgame perfect in Γg if, and only if, δ ≥ δgcrit,
and (ii) the competitive price policy profile cg is subgame perfect in subgame Γg for any δ ≥ 0. With
these results at hand, the proof of the “if”- and “only if”-part of the remark follows immediately.
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Our competition game Γ is continuous at infinity if for any ε > 0, any retailer i ∈ I, and any
outcome o ∈ O, there exists a period t0 so that
|Πi(õ)−Πi(o)| < ε
for any outcome õ ∈ O satisfying õt = ot for any period t ≤ t0. To establish this property, let us
consider some ε > 0, some retailer i ∈ I, and some outcome o := (g, q0, q1, . . . ) ∈ O. We note that,
due to Assumptions (D1),(D2), (R1) and (I), the one-stage profit πi is bounded. More precisely, it
holds −cD(0) ≤ πi(q) ≤ πm for any profile q ∈ RI+ of advertised prices. Let us define η := πm+cD(0).
Obviously, it holds |πgi (q̃) − π
g
i (q)| ≤ η for any q, q̃ ∈ R
I
+ and g ∈ G. Choose some sufficiently large
period t0 ≥ 0 so that δ
t0
1−δ η < ε. Moreover, consider some outcome õ := (g̃, q̃
0, q̃1, . . . ) ∈ O which is
































we have shown that competition game Γ satisfies continuity at infinity.
A business policy s̃i in competition game Γ is said to be a one-shot deviation from business policy
si if s̃i deviates from si at a single history, i.e., there is some history h so that s̃|H\{h} = s|H\{h} and
s̃(h) 6= s(h). A strategy profile s := (si)i∈I is said to satisfy the one-shot deviation property if none
of the players gains by a one-shot deviation in any subgame of Γ, or more formally, if
Πi(o
h(s)) ≥ Πi(oh(s̃))
for any strategy profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) ∈ S where s̃i is a one-shot deviation from si, any player i ∈ I,
and any history h ∈ H. We remark that this property can be described in a simpler way. As can be
easily shown, it suffices to demonstrate that the above weak inequality is satisfied for any strategy
profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) ∈ S where s̃i is a one-shot deviation from si at history h.
According to Theorem 3.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), subgame perfectness can be checked
by the one-shot deviation property. Note, since our competition game Γ is continuous at infinity, any
of its subgames is continuous at infinity, too. Therefore, it is admissible to apply the One-Stage
Deviation Principle to any subgame of Γ. In the following, we do this for the subgames Γg.
We conclude from these considerations that price policy profile sg proves to be subgame perfect
in Γg if, and only if, none of the retailers can increase its payoff by an one-shot deviation from sg in
some subgame of Γg. This in turn means that sg is subgame perfect in Γg if, and only if, it holds for
any retailer i ∈ I that Πi(oh(s)) ≥ Πi(oh(s̃)) is satisfied for some business policy profile s inducing
sg in Γg and any business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) which is a one-shot deviation of si at some
non-initial history h ∈ Ht0g (i.e., h is a history up to period t0 ≥ −1 according to which clause profile
g has been adopted in the implementation phase).
Let us first prove claim (i). For this purpose, we pick some clause profile g ∈ G and consider some
business policy profile s inducing the grim-trigger price policy profile tg := (tgj )j∈I in subgame Γ
g.
Moreover, we choose some period t0 ≥ −1 and some history h ∈ Ht0g .
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 Suppose either t0 = −1 or ht0j,t = p
m for any j ∈ I and any 0 ≤ t ≤ t0. The outcome induced by
history h and business policy profile s is oh(s) = (h, pm, pm, pm, . . . ). Pick some retailer i ∈ I and
suppose now that retailer i pursues business policy s̃i which is one-shot deviation from business
policy si at non-initial history h ∈ Ht0g . Let s̃gi be the price policy in subgame Γ
g induced by
business policy s̃i. Obviously, s̃
g differs from grim-trigger price policy tgi only at history h. We
define qt0+1i := s̃
g




i (h) = p
m. The outcome induced by history h
and business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) is o
h(s̃) = (h, (qt0+1i , p
m































1− δ κi π





Since qt0+1i 6= p
m can be arbitrarily chosen, a one-shot deviation from the grim-trigger price
policy at history h proves to be not profitable for retailer i in subgame Γh if, and only if, the
common discount factor δ satisfies
1






 Suppose t0 ≥ 0 and ht0j,t 6= p
m for some j ∈ I and some 0 ≤ t ≤ t0. The outcome induced by
history h and business policy profile s is oh(s) := (h, c, c, c, . . . ). Pick some retailer i ∈ I and
suppose now that retailer i pursues business policy s̃i which is one-shot deviation from business
policy si at non-initial history h ∈ Ht0g . Let s̃gi be the price policy in subgame Γ
g induced by
business policy s̃i. Obviously, s̃
g
i differs from grim-trigger price policy t
g
i only at history h. As
above, we define qt0+1i := s̃
g




i (h) = c. The outcome induced by
history h and business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) is o
h(s̃) = (h, (qt0+1i , c−i), c, c, . . . ).
Note that Assumptions (D2), (D4), (R1), and (I) entail 0 ≥ πgi (q
t0+1























Since qt0+1i 6= p
m can be arbitrarily chosen, a one-shot deviation from the grim-trigger price
policy at history h is never profitable for retailer i in subgame Γh regardless of the common
discount factor δ ≥ 0.
Summing up the above two cases, one-shot deviations from the grim-trigger price policy are not
profitable for retailer i in any subgame of Γg if, and only if, common discount factor δ satisfies the
weak inequality
1






or equivalently, δ ≥ δgi,crit. From this weak inequality, we conclude that none of the retailers has an
incentive in some subgame of Γg to choose a one-stage deviation from the grim-trigger price policy
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if, and only if, δ ≥ δgcrit := max{δ
g
i,crit : i ∈ I}. Resorting to the One-Shot Deviation Principle,
we conclude that the grim-trigger price policy profile is subgame-perfect in subgame Γg as long as
δ ≥ δgcrit.
Let us now prove claim (ii). For this purpose, pick some clause profile g ∈ G and some business
policy profile s inducing the competitive price policy cg := (cgj )j∈I in subgame Γ
g. Moreover, choose
some period t0 ≥ −1 and some history h ∈ Ht0g . Obviously, the outcome induced by history h and
business policy profile s is oh(s) = (h, c, c, c, . . . ).
Choose some retailer i and suppose now that retailer i pursues business policy s̃i which is one-
shot deviation from business policy si at non-initial history h ∈ Ht0g . Let s̃gi be the price policy in
subgame Γg induced by business policy s̃i. Obviously, s̃
g
i differs from competitive price policy c
g
i only




i (h) = c. The outcome induced by
h and business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, s−i) is o
h(s) = (h, (qt0i , c−i), c, c, . . . ).
Due to Assumptions (D2), (D4), (R1), and (I), it holds 0 ≥ πgi (q
t0+1






















Since qt0+1i 6= p
m can be arbitrarily chosen, a one-shot deviation from the competitive price policy at
history h is never profitable for retailer i in subgame Γh regardless of common discount factor δ ≥ 0.
This holds for any retailer i so that none of them has an incentive to choose a one-stage deviation
from the competitive price policy in any subgame of Γg regardless of the value of common discount
factor δ. Applying the One-Shot Deviation Principle, we conclude that the competitive price
policy is subgame-perfect in subgame Γg for any common discount factor δ ≥ 0.
Summing up, we have shown that (i) the grim-trigger price policy profile in subgame Γg is subgame
perfect if, and only if, δ ≥ δgcrit, and (ii) the competitive price policy profile in subgame Γ
g is subgame
perfect for any δ ≥ 0. Resorting to these results, we will prove the “if”- and “only if”-part of this
remark.
(“if ”) Let ŝ := (ŝi)i∈I be a strategy profile satisfying Properties (T1) and (T2). Applying our
result (i) to Property (T1), we obtain
ŝg =
{
tg if tg is a subgame perfect equilibrium in Γg,
cg otherwise
for any clause profile g ∈ G. We also know from our result (ii) that competitive price policy profile
cg is subgame perfect in any subgame Γg. Therefore, business policy profile ŝ induces a subgame
perfect strategy profile in any subgame Γg. This in turn implies that any one-stage deviation from
ŝ at histories h ∈ Ht0 where t0 ≥ −1 is not profitable in subgame Γh. According to the One-Shot
Deviation Principle, in order to establish that ŝ is subgame perfect in Γ, it remains to show that
one-stage deviations from ŝi at initial history h := ∅ are also not profitable for any retailer i. However,
this is guaranteed by Property (T2).




tg if tg if δ ≥ δgcrit,
cg otherwise
and, thus, Property (T1) is satisfied. Moreover, the One-Shot Deviation Principle immediately
implies Property (T2). 
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Proof of Remark 4. (“if ”) Consider the business policy profile ŝ := (ĝ, (ŝg)g∈G) satisfying Prop-
erty (T1). By Property (M1), the grim-trigger price policies are applied by all retailers in subgame
Γĝ. This entails that business policy profile ŝ induces the collusive outcome and, thus, any retailer i
earns a total profit
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− 1Ci(gi) f.
at this business policy profile.
Let us now consider a business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, ŝ−i)) where s̃i := (g̃i, (ŝ
g
i )g∈G) and g̃i 6= gi.
In words, the only difference between business policy profiles ŝ and s̃ is that retailer i pursues a
different competition clause policy. In the following, we compare the total profits retailer i earns at
those business policy profiles:
 If δ ≥ δg̃crit as well as i ∈ C(ĝ) and i ∈ C(g̃), then both business policy profiles induce the
collusive outcome. Since retailer i adopts a CC in both business policy profiles, we obtain
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f = Πi(o(s̃)) .
 If δ ≥ δg̃crit as well as i /∈ C(ĝ) and i ∈ C(g̃), then both business policy profiles induce the
collusive outcome. Since retailer i does not adopt a CC in business policy profile ŝ, but in
business policy profile s̃, we obtain
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m) >
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f = Πi(o(s̃)) .
 If δ < δg̃crit as well as i ∈ C(ĝ) and i ∈ C(g̃), then different outcomes are realized by the two
business policy profiles. While the collusive outcome is reached by business policy profile ŝ, the
competitive outcome is reached by business policy profile s̃. Since retailer i adopts a CC in both
business policy profiles, we obtain
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f > −f = Πi(o(s̃)) .
 If δ < δg̃crit as well as i /∈ C(ĝ) and i ∈ C(g̃), then different outcomes are realized by the two
business policy profiles. While the collusive outcome is reached by business policy profile ŝ, the
competitive outcome is reached by business policy profile s̃. Since retailer i does not adopt a
CC in business policy profile ŝ, but in business policy profile s̃, we obtain
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m) > −f = Πi(o(s̃)) .
 If i ∈ C(ĝ) and i /∈ C(g̃), then g̃ = (wi, ĝ−i). It follows from Property (M2) that δ < δg̃crit.
Hence, while business policy profile ŝ induces the collusive outcome, business policy profile s̃
induces the competitive outcome. Note that retailer i adopts a CC in business policy profile ŝ,
but does not in business policy profile s̃. Nevertheless, we obtain from Property (M3) that
Πi(o(ŝ)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f = 1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− fg,δcrit ≥ 0 = Πi(o(s̃)) .
Summing up, we obtain Πi(o(ŝ)) ≥ Πi(o(s̃)) for any business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, ŝ−i) where
s̃i := (g̃i, (ŝ
g
i )g∈G). That means, Property (T2) has been established. Moreover, since business
policy profile ŝ also satisfies Property (T1) by construction, we conclude from Remark 3 that ŝ is
subgame perfect. As was shown above, ŝ induces the collusive outcome. Hence, ŝ ∈ Sm(δ, f, n, z).
(“only if ”) Suppose clause profile ĝ is perfectly collusive. By definition, there is a business policy
profile ŝ := (ĝ, (ŝg)g∈G) ∈ Sm(δ, f, n, z). Obviously, ŝ ∈ Sg(δ, f, n, z). We conclude from Remark
3 that ŝ satisfies Properties (T1) and (T2). Since ŝ induces the collusive price outcome, it holds
δ ≥ δĝcrit and, hence, Property (M1) is satisfied.
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We proceed indirectly to establish Property (M2). Let us suppose contrary to our claim that
δg̃crit ≤ δ for some clause profile g̃ := (wi, ĝ−i) where i ∈ C(ĝ). We define business policy profile
s̃ := (g̃, (ŝg)g∈G). Since business policy profile ŝ
g̃ induces the grim-trigger price policy profile in
subgame Γg̃, the collusive outcome is realized by s̃ and it holds
Πi(o(s̃)) =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m) >
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f = Πi(o(ŝ)) .
However, this result contradicts Property (T2). Hence, it holds δ < δg̃crit for any g̃ := (wi, ĝ−i)
where i ∈ C(ĝ). We conclude that Property (M2) is satisfied.
We also proceed indirectly to establish Property (M3). Let us suppose that Properties (M1)
and (M2) are satisfied and contrary to our claim that f > f ĝ,δcrit. We note that the latter strict
inequality implies C(ĝ) 6= ∅; otherwise, it would be f ĝ,δcrit = +∞ and the strict inequality could
not be satisfied. Consider retailer i := minC(ĝ) and business policy profile s̃ := (s̃i, ŝ−i) where
s̃i := (wi, (ŝ
g
i )g∈G). Resorting to Properties (M1) and (M2), we obtain
Πi(o(s̃)) = 0 =
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f ĝ,δcrit >
1
1− δ κi π(p
m)− f = Πi(o(ŝ)) .
Apparently, this strict inequality violates Property (T2). Hence, it holds f ≤ f ĝ,δcrit and, thus,
Property (M3) has been established. 
Proof of Proposition 5. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose ŝ := (ĝ, (ŝg)g∈G) is a
subgame perfect business policy profile (of Sg(δ, f, n, z)) in which retailer i adopts a CC, but which
induces the competitive price outcome. That means, ĝi 6= wi and ŝĝ = cĝ. Obviously, retailer i earns
a profit Πi(o(ŝ)) = −f at this business policy profile. Consider now the business policy profile s̃
which corresponds to ŝ except that instead of adopting ĝi retailer i abstains from offering any CC,
i.e., s̃ := (s̃i, ŝ−i) where s̃i := (wi, (ŝ
g
i )g∈G). We obtain Πi(o(s̃)) ≥ 0 > Πi(o(ŝ)), violating property
(T2). Remark 3 implies that ŝ is not subgame perfect. However, this result is at odds with our
initial assumption. 
Proof of Theorem 6.
(a) We proceed indirectly. If δ < δcrit, then clause profile w (i.e., the clause profile in which none of
the retailers adopts a CC) violates Property (M1). We conclude from Remark 4 that clause profile
w is not perfectly collusive if δ < δcrit.
(b) Suppose δ ≥ δcrit. Let us first examine whether clause profile w is perfectly collusive. By
assumption, Property (M1) holds. Property (M2) is trivially satisfied because C(w) = ∅. Note
that fw,δcrit = +∞ by definition. Therefore, Property (M3) is also satisfied. We infer from Remark
4 that clause profile w is perfectly collusive.
To prove the uniqueness of the perfectly collusive clause profile, let us consider some clause profile
g 6= w. Since C(g) 6= ∅, we can pick some i ∈ C(g) and define clause profile g̃ := (wi, g−i). Applying
Remark 2, we obtain δ ≥ δg̃crit. This in turn entails that clause profile g violates Property (M1). It
follows from Remark 4 that g is not perfectly collusive. Summing up, we have shown that if δ ≥ δcrit,
then the trivial clause profile w is the unique perfectly collusive clause profile. 
Proof of Remark 7. Obviously, the claim is true for the trivial clause profile w. For this reason,
let us suppose from now on that clause profile g satisfies C(g) 6= ∅. Our assumption KC(g) ≤ D(pm)




Pick some i ∈ C(g). We examine the situation in which retailer i advertises price qi < pm while
all of its competitors advertise price pm. Since KC(g) ≤ D(pm), retailer i’s sales at the effective
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purchase prices qp are Xi(q
p) = ki by Assumptions (D2), (R1), and (I). Hence, its profit amounts
to πgi (qi, p
m














. By Remark 2, we obtain δgcrit = δcrit. 
Proof of Theorem 8. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose there is a perfectly collusive
clause profile ĝ satisfying KC(g) ≤ D(pm). We already know from Remark 7 that δgcrit = δcrit. Since
δ < δgcrit is assumed, Property (M1) is violated. It follows from Remark 4 that clause profile ĝ is
not perfectly collusive. 
Proof of Remark 9. Pick some retailer i and suppose δ < δi,crit. Due to Assumption (D2),
the monopolistic profit mapping π̄i(·) is continuous. Assumptions (D1) and (D3) ensure that π̄i(·)
is increasing on [c, pm]. Moreover, it holds π̄i(c) = 0 and π̄i(p
m) = (pm − c) min{ki, D(pm)}. By
assumption and Remark 2, we have δ < 1−max{κi, D(p
m)
K
}. Regardless of whether ki ≤ D(pm) or
ki > D(p
m), we always obtain
π̄i(c) = 0 <
1
1− δ κiπ
m < (pm − c) min{ki, D(pm)} = π̄i(pm).
The Intermediate Value Theorem implies that there exists some p̄δi ∈]c, pm[ satisfying π̄i(p̄δi ) =
1
1−δκiπ
m. Moreover, since monopolistic profit mapping π̄i(·) is increasing on [c, pm], value p̄δi is
unique.
Consider some common discount factor β < δ. As argued above, there exists some unique p̄βi ∈









m. Since monopolistic profit
mapping π̄i(·) is increasing on [c, pm], we obtain p̄βi < p̄
δ
i .

















m. Since monopolistic profit mapping π̄j(·) is increasing on [c, pm], we
conclude that p̄δj ≤ p̄δi . 
Proof of Theorem 10. We prove this claim by contradiction. Suppose that f > f̄δ, but ĝ is
perfectly collusive. Since δ < δcrit, we infer from Theorem 8 that KC(ĝ) > D(p
m). Obviously,
C(ĝ) 6= ∅ and, thus, we can define i := minC(ĝ). By assumption, f > 1
1−δκiπi(p
m). However, this
strict inequality is at odds with Property (M3). It follows from Remark 4 that ĝ is not perfectly
collusive.
From now on, we assume that f ≤ f̄δ, but z > z̄δ1 . To show that there is no perfectly collusive
collusive price even in this case, consider some arbitrary clause profile g and retailer 1. Moreover,
suppose that retailer 1 advertises some price c + z̄δ1 < q1 < min{c + z, pm} while its competitors
advertise price pm. Due to Assumption (G), it holds q1 < q
p




−1) = (q1 − c) min{k1, D(q1)} = π̄1(q1)

















We conclude from this result that δ < δg1,crit ≤ δ
g
crit. However, this results violates Property (M1)
of Remark 4. Consequently, clause profile g is not perfectly collusive. 
Proof of Theorem 11. Consider a clause profile ĝ in which retailer i offers a CC of the form ĝe,µi
where µ < z. Moreover, we define g := (wi, ĝ−i), which is the clause profile corresponding to ĝ except
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For this purpose, let us first consider retailer i. We suppose that this retailer advertises price
qi 6= pm while its competitors advertise price pm. In the following, we compare the profits retailer i
earns under the clause profiles ĝ and g given such price announcements.
 Suppose qi > p
m. By assumption, it holds pm − z < ĝsi(qi, pm−i) ≤ gsi(qi, pm−i) = qi. This
immediately implies ĝpi (qi, p
m
−i) > p
m and gpi (qi, p
m
−i) > p
m. Moreover, due to Assumption (G),







m for any k 6= i. We conclude from Assumptions (D2),
(D4), (R1), and (I) that Xi(ĝ
p(qi, p
m
−i)) = 0 = Xi(g
p(qi, p
m








 Suppose qi < p






−i) = qi. Moreover,





























Let us now consider some retailer j 6= i and suppose that this retailer advertises price qj 6= pm
while its competitors advertise price pm. In the following, we will specify the profits retailer j earns
under the clause profiles ĝ and g given such price announcements.
 Suppose qj > p




j (qj , p
m
−j) ≤ qk. Moreover, Assumption (G) implies
























j (qj , p
m
−j) =
πgj (qj , p
m
−j).
 Suppose qj < p
m. We note that qj = ĝ
p




j (qj , p
m







−k) ≤ pm for any k 6= i, j. By assumption, we have qj−z < ĝsi(qi, pm−i) ≤ gsi(qi, pm−i) = pm.




−i) ≤ gpi (qi, p
m
−i) = p
m. Hence, we obtain [ĝp(qj , p
m
−j) < qj ] =
[gpj (qj , p
m
−j) < qj ] and [ĝ
p(qj , p
m
−j) = qj ] = [g
p
j (qj , p
m
−j) = qj ]. We conclude from Assumptions



















j (qj , p
m
−j).






−k) for any qk 6= pm and any k ∈ I. This












j,crit for any j ∈ I. The
latter result in turn entails δĝcrit = δ
g
crit.
However, the equality violates Property (M2). Since according to Remark 4 this property is a
necessary condition for subgame perfect collusion, we conclude that clause profile ĝ is not perfectly
collusive. Thereby, we have shown that none of the retailers in a perfectly collusive profile adopts a
CC with lump sum refund µ < z. 
Proof of Remark 12.
Before proving parts (a) and (b) of the claim, we derive some general statements. First, note that






. This in turn
implies KJ > D(p
m). Therefore, although not explicitly stated there, KJ > D(p
m) holds even in
part (b).
Let g be a clause profile in which a coalition J ⊆ I of retailers adopt a CC with lump sum refund
z and the other retailers do not adopt a CC, i.e., g is given by g := (gJ , w−J) where gi := g
e,z
i for
any i ∈ J . We suppose that KJ > D(pm).
Pick some i ∈ J of the CC-adopting retailers and consider the situation in which retailer i
advertises price qi 6= pm while its competitors advertise price pm. In the following, we will provide
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 If qi > p
m, the CC of retailer i implies qpi = p
m and qsi = p




for any competitor j 6= i. It follows from Assumptions (R1) and (I) that retailer i’s sales are
Xi(q
p) = κiD(p
m) and, thus, its profit amounts to πgi (qi, p
m
−i) = (p
m − z − c)κiD(pm). Since







m − z − c)κiD(pm) .
 If c + z ≤ qi < pm, it holds qpi = q
s
i = qi. Moreover, the CCs of the competitors j ∈ J \ {i}
imply that qsj = qi − z and qpj = qi for any j ∈ J \ {i}. Obviously, the competitors j ∈ I \ J
charge price qpj = q
s
j = p
m. It follows from Assumptions (R1) and (I) that retailer i’s sales
are Xi(q




−i) = (qi − c) min{ki, κiκJD(qi)}.
Since the latter result holds for any c+ z ≤ qi < pm and KJ > D(pm) is assumed, we conclude






m − c) κi
κJ
D(pm) .
 If c ≤ qi < c+ z, it holds qpi = q
s
i = qi. Moreover, since the CCs of the competitors j ∈ J \ {i}
satisfy Assumption (G), we have qsj = c and q
p
j = c + z > qi for any competitor j ∈ J \ {i}.
Obviously, the competitors j ∈ I \ J charge price qpj = q
s
j = p
m. It follows from Assumptions
(R1) and (I) that retailer i’s sales are Xi(q
p) = min{ki, D(qi)} and, thus, its profit amounts
to πgi (qi, p
m
−i) = π̄i(qi) = (qi − c) min{ki, D(qi)}. Since the latter result holds for any c ≤
qi < c+ z and monopolistic profit mapping π̄i(·) is increasing on [c, pm] and continuous due to





−i) = z min{ki, D(c+ z)} .
Pick now some retailer i /∈ J and suppose that it advertises price qi 6= pm while its competitors
advertise price pm. In the following, we will provide some upper bounds of i’s profit πgi (qi, p
m
−i).
 If qi > p
m, then qpi = q
s





m for any competitor j 6= i. It
follows from Assumptions (D4), (R1), and (I) that retailer i has no sales and, thus, its profit
is πgi (qi, p
m







 If c + z ≤ qi < pm, it holds qpi = q
s
i = qi. Moreover, the CCs of the competitors j ∈ J imply




m. It follows from Assumptions (R1) and (I) that retailer i’s sales are Xi(q
p) =




−i) = (qi−c) min{ki, κiκJ∪{i}D(qi)}. Since
the latter result holds for any c+ z ≤ qi < pm and KJ > D(pm) is assumed, we conclude from






m − c) κi
κJ∪{i}
D(pm) .
 If c ≤ qi < c + z, it holds qpi = q
s
i = qi. Since the CCs of the competitors j ∈ J satisfy
Assumption (G), we have qsj = c and q
p
j = c + z > qi for any j ∈ J . The other competitors
j ∈ I \ J charge price qpj = q
s
j = p
m. It follows from Assumptions (R1) and (I) that retailer
i’s sales are Xi(q
p) = min{ki, D(qi)} and, thus, its profit amounts to πgi (qi, p
m
−i) = π̄i(qi) =
(qi − c) min{ki, D(qi)}. Since the latter result holds for any c ≤ qi < c + z and monopolistic
profit mapping π̄i(·) is increasing on [c, pm] and continuous due to Assumptions (D1), (D2),





−i) = z min{ki, D(c+ z)} .
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This in turn entails δgi,crit ≥ 1− κJ . Therefore, it holds δ
g
crit ≥ 1− κJ .




any p ∈ R+. Since π̄1(c + z̄1−κJ1 ) =
κ1
κJ




















−i) ≤ κiκJ π
m
and, thus, δgi,crit ≤ 1−κJ for any i ∈ I. We already know that δ
g
i,crit ≥ 1−κJ for any i ∈ J . Therefore,
δgi,crit = 1− κJ for any i ∈ J . We conclude from this result that δ
g
crit = 1− κJ if z ≤ z̄
1−κJ
1 .












where both weak inequalities turn into equalities if, and only if, κJ = 1− δ and i ∈ J .









m. Since monopolistic profit mapping π̄i(·) is increasing on [c, pm] and continuous









where the weak inequality becomes strict if z < z̄δ1 and turns into the equality if z = z̄
δ
1 and i = 1.









for any i ∈ I. This in turn entails δgi,crit ≤ δ for any i ∈ I and, thus, δ
g
crit ≤ δ. Moreover, we conclude
from the above findings that δgcrit = δ if, and only if, κJ = 1− δ or z = z̄
δ
i . 
Proof of Theorem 13. Suppose our competition model Γ(δ, f, n, z) satisfies conditions δ < δcrit
and z ≤ z̄δ1 . The latter condition means that the hassle-free case z = 0 as well as the case with hassle
costs 0 < z < z̄δ1 are taken into account.
(“if”) Consider a non-trivial clause profile ĝ := (ĝe,zJ , w−J) satisfying conditions (i) , (ii), and
(iii). We apply the characterization in Remark 4 to establish that ĝ is perfectly collusive. Note that
condition (iii) is nothing but Property (M3). Therefore, it remains to prove Properties (M1) and
(M2).
Applying condition (i) and Remark 12(b), we obtain δĝcrit ≤ δ and, thus, Property (M1). To
prove Property (M2), pick some i ∈ J and consider clause profile g := (wi, ĝ−i). If KJ\{i} ≤ D(pm),
we resort to Remark 7 and immediately obtain δgcrit = δcrit > δ. If KJ\{i} > D(p
m), we apply
Remark 12(a). This remark implies δgcrit ≥ 1−κJ\{i}. Define j := min J . Since 1−κJ\{i} ≥ 1−κJ\{j}
and 1−κJ\{j} > δ due to condition (ii), we finally obtain δgcrit > δ. Summing up, we have established
Properties (M1), (M2), and (M3). Hence, ĝ proves to be perfectly collusive.
(“only if”) Consider a non-trivial and perfectly collusive clause profile ĝ := (ĝe,zJ , w−J). According
to Remark 4, clause profile ĝ satisfies Properties (M1), (M2), and (M3). Note that the latter
property is identical to condition (iii). Therefore, it remains to prove conditions (i) and (ii).
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Since ĝ is perfectly collusive and δ < δcrit, Theorem 8 requires KJ > D(p
m). It then follows
from Remark 12(a) that 1 − κJ ≤ δĝcrit. Since δ
ĝ
crit ≤ δ by Property (M1), we obtain 1 − κJ ≤ δ
and, thus, condition (i). Define j := min J and consider clause profile g := (wj , ĝ−j). Since δ
g
crit > δ
by Property (M2), we deduce from Remark 12(b) that κJ\{j} < 1− δ. That means, condition (ii)
also holds. Summing up, we have shown that conditions (i), (ii), and (iii) are satisfied. 
Proof of Proposition 15. Pick some common discount factor δ ≤ δcrit and define
J :=
{
J ⊆ I : (ge,zJ , w−J) is perfectly collusive in Γ(δ, f, n, z)
}
.
Obviously, k̂ := max{k ∈ I : 1 − κIk ≤ δ} is well-defined. We stipulate Ĵ := Ik̂. Since clause
profile ĝ := (ge,z
Ĵ
, w−Ĵ) satisfies the conditions (i) - (iii) of Theorem 13, it is perfectly collusive in
Γ(δ, f, n, z). Therefore, J 6= ∅. We will demonstrate that ĝ is the only robustly collusive clause
profile in Ge,z.
Consider first some clause profile g := (ge,zJ , w−J) ∈ G
e,z where |J | < |Ĵ |. Condition (ii) of
Theorem 13 and the construction of k̂ imply δ < 1 − κĴ\{k̂} ≤ 1 − κJ . That means, g does not
satisfy condition (i) of Theorem 13. In consequence, g is not perfectly collusive. Since any clause
profile g := (ge,zJ , w−J) ∈ G
e,z satisfying |J | < |Ĵ | is not perfectly collusive, we have shown that ĝ is
cost-efficient in Ge,z.
Let us now consider a clause profile g := (ge,zJ , w−J) ∈ G
e,z where J ∈ J and |J | = |Ĵ |, but
J 6= Ĵ . That is, g is a perfectly collusive clause profile of Ge,z which is different from ĝ, but has
the same number of CC-adopting retailers. Obviously, we have 1 − κĴ < 1 − κJ . It then follows





1 . Applying Remark 12(a), we obtain δ
ĝ
crit = 1 − κĴ <






m = fδ,ĝcrit. Summing up, we have shown that ĝ has a lower critical discount
factor and greater critical implementation costs than g. We conclude from these results that ĝ is the
only robustly collusive clause profile in Ge,z. 
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